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The primary goal of this monograph is to examine the requirements of lawful 
taking of foreign property in international law. Furthermore, it tries to prove that there are 
three
1
 requirements of such taking, that is to say, taking should be for public purpose, 
non-discriminatory and appropriate compensation should be provided. To prove this, 
international jurisprudence, related academic literature, and international case law will be 
analyzed. 
 
 Taking of foreign property is one of the so-called non-commercial risks foreign 
investors have to face abroad.
2
 There might be other non-commercial risks as well, like 
that of currency inconvertibility, repatriation limitation, currency devaluation, political 
violence (which includes war, terrorism and revolution), and deterioration in investment 
environment.
3
 However, the risk of taking property constitutes the greatest risk for a 
foreign investor.
4
 This does not need much explanation: when the investment is taken it is 
not possible to operate it any more. Thus, for many investors the issue of decreasing the 
risk of taking their investment is a crucial one. With good investment protection systems 
(e.g., investment protection treaties, investment insurance) the risk of taking cannot be 
avoided entirely - but, the loss to the investor can be minimized. However, many times, 
even a good investment protection system can only mitigate the loss. The reason is that 
even if there is compensation paid for the property taken, usually it does not gratify 
foreign investors. For example, they will not be compensated for (as appropriate or full 
compensation usually does not include)
5
 the expected future profits, or for the business 
idea and know-how of where (it can be geographic place or an economic branch) and 
how to look for good profit. Transferred technology and transferred know-how can also 
constitute a considerable value, for what there is usually no compensation paid. 
Therefore, the risk factor is many times present for the investors. In addition, many 
investments require high initial expenditure. This means that in the case of indirect or so-
called creeping expropriation,
6
 it is very expensive to withdraw from the host state 
quickly if the investment environment becomes hostile. Therefore, investors usually look 
for investment opportunities with low risk of taking. Such law risk of taking exists in 
countries with long tradition of stable political and economic system. 
 
                                                          
1
 Additional requirement is that during taking ‘due process’ should be respected. However, this last 
requirement is not examined in this book because of its procedural character. 
2
 Some examples for commercial risk: rescission or cancellation of contract, suspension of performance, 
non-payment because of insolvency or default of the debtor see HANS VAN HOUTTE, THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 286 (2002). 
3
 See J. W. Yackee, Political Risk and International Investment Law, 24 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 477, 478-
83 (2013-2014); ROBERT B. SHANKS, PROTECTING AGAINST POLITICAL RISK, INCLUDING CURRENCY 
CONVERTIBILITY AND REPATRIATION OF PROFITS IN EASTERN EUROPE 26 (1992). 
4
 See SEBASTIÁN LÓPEZ ESCARCENA, INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2014). 
5
 See infra Chapter IV. 
6







Property. Before examining the notion of taking, we want to devote few words to the 
notion of property and also to the issue of what can be object of taking. The term property 
is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as “an aggregate of rights which are guaranteed and 
protected by the government”
7
. According to Bergmann, a German scholar, there is no 
common notion of property in international law. International law deduces this notion 
from different national laws.
8
 Another scholar, Sacerdoti, claims that all rights having an 
economic content (including immaterial and contractual rights) are covered by 
international law in the case of taking, thus any of such rights can be considered property 
(and thus can be taken) in his understanding.
9
 Regarding case law, in Starett Housing 
Corporation case the Iran – United States Tribunal
10
 stated that shareholder rights and 
contractual rights can also be the object of expropriation.
11
 Or in another case, the 
Tribunal stated that “Expropriation, […], may extend to any right which can be the object 
of a commercial transaction, i.e., freely sold and bought, and thus has a monetary 
value”.
12
 Based on all this, it can be concluded that the term property is relatively widely 
defined. 
 
Taking. Academic literature, treaties, court and arbitral decisions frequently use 
interchangeably the notions taking, expropriation and nationalization for a very similar 
legal concept. Hence, it is a very difficult task to define what is exactly understood under 
the notion of taking of foreign property. We use this term, as we have found it the most 
comprehensive and general of the above mentioned three notions. In Black’s Law 
Dictionary the notion of taking is formulated as: 
 
The government’s actual or effective acquisition of private property either by ousting the 
owner and claiming title or by destroying the property or severely impairing its utility. 
There is a taking of property when government action directly interferes with or 




                                                          
7
 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 845 (6
th
 ed. 1991). 
8
 See HEIDI BERGMANN, DIE VÖLKERRECHTLICHE ENTSCHÄDIGUNG IM FALLE DER ENTEIGNUNG 
VERTRAGSRECHTLICHER POSITIONEN 31 (1997). 
9
 See GIORGIO SACERDOTI, BILATERAL TREATIES AND MULTILATERAL INSTRUMENTS ON INVESTMENT 
PROTECTION 381 (1997). 
10
 The Iran - United States Claims Tribunal was established to solve disputes related to expropriated 
American property following the Iranian revolution in 1979. 
11
 Starrett Housing Corporation v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 156-57 (1983); See 
also RICHARD B. LILLICH ET AL., THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL: ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE 
LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 189 (1998); V. Heiskanen, Doctrine of Indirect Expropriation in Light of 
the Practice of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 8 J. World Investment & Trade 215, 221-25 (2007); 
ANDREW NEWCOMBE LLUÍS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 327 (2009). 
12
 Amoco Int’l Finance Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 15 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 220 (1987). 
13
 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1467 (7
th
 ed. 1999). 
 6 
This definition can be considered broad, as it includes not only direct, but also 
indirect taking of property, the owner is not in the position of using and enjoying his 
property. Richard Epstein gives an even broader definition when he argues that any 
governmental action, that interferes with any aspect of the use of private property 
protected by common law, constitutes a taking.
14
 Under this theory, every regulation, 
even taxation (not only excessive taxation, but the regular one as well), would constitute 
a taking.
15
 Folsom and Gordon, two American authors, formulate this notion as the loss, 
to various degrees, of the “use and/or ownership incidents, which accompany the private 
ownership of property”.
16
 The above definitions might sound general, but at the same 
time they cover the comprehensive nature of the term. Infra, where the notion is 
examined in related case law, this comprehensive nature is showed, in the sense that there 
is no single definition for taking, and that even rights, like contractual rights, can be 
included, that is to say, ‘taken’. 
 
Not only in international legal literature, as already mentioned above, but also in 
legislation of individual countries and in international agreements, many times, taking, 
expropriation and nationalization are used interchangeably. The problem is usually not 
with the usage of these terms, but more with the issue what is in practice covered by 
them. Sometimes these terms are defined in detail in legal texts containing these words. 
However, the majority of documents examined show that there is frequently a lack of 
exact definition of the concept of taking (expropriation, nationalization), and it is not at 
all clear what is covered by these terms in certain situations.
17
 The reason might be that it 
is the interest of capital exporting countries to understand taking of property as widely as 
possible, and therefore, they will refrain from any definition that is too narrow. They 
might sometimes even prefer vague definitions when concluding investment protection 
agreements to avoid dispute at the time of concluding such agreements. However, such 
policy might result in later disputes with a very uncertain outcome. It should be noted, 
that it is also very difficult to draw the line between de jure and de facto expropriation, 
that might, and in fact, constitutes another problem. However, we will deal with this 
problem in detail below. 
 
                                                          
14
 See NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS 93 (2001) [Primary source was not available]. 
15
 There is an interesting article on this issue by P. B. Stephan (Taxation and Expropriation - The 
Destruction of the Yukos Oil Empire. Houston Journal of International Law. Vol. 35, Issue 1 (Winter 
2013), pp. 1-52. 
16
 See RALPH H. FOLSOM, MICHAEL W. GORDON, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 639 (3d ed. 
1995); Ian Brownlie defines it as: “[…] deprivation by state organs of a right of property either as such, or 
by permanent transfer of the power of management and control”. The right of management also constitute a 
right that has a value and can be taken. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
534 (5
th
 ed. 1998); Restatement (Second) Foreign Relations Law of the United States, sec. 192 (1965) 
defines it as ”conduct attributable to state that is intended to and does, effectively deprive an alien of 
substantially all the benefit of his interest in property even though the state does not deprive him of his 
entire legal interest in property”. 
17
 Here under ‘certain situation’ we mean cases when legal norms are applied in practice. 
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Some authors use the term taking as a collective notion, covering even 
intervention and confiscation.
18
 Following this path, we channel our analysis of notions 
accordingly. However, it has to be emphasized again that both in practice and in theory, 
terms taking, expropriation and nationalization are many times used interchangeably.
19
 It 
follows that there is no elaborated concept on these terms in international law, which 
might give opportunity for abuse and for legal uncertainty. 
 
Expropriation, nationalization. The most widespread term connected to taking of 
foreign investment, though it does not have such a general meaning as the term taking, is 
expropriation. The simplest definition of expropriation is given in Black’s Law 
Dictionary, which defines it as a “governmental taking or a modification of an 
individual’s property rights.”
20
 However, this is a fairly general definition again. It can 
include both de facto and de jure taking. Nationalization is defined in the same dictionary 
as the “act of bringing an industry under governmental control or ownership.”
21
 It is, in 
one aspect, narrower than the definition of expropriation: it emphasizes the taking of 
‘industry’, and not property or property rights which definitely makes it narrower. 
However, it is worth mentioning that the wording “governmental control” does not make 
the definition of nationalization wider compared to the definition of expropriation, as this 
control is not more and not less than “taking or a modification of an individual’s property 
rights” as it is stated in the definition of expropriation. 
 
Folsom and Gordon define expropriation as an ‘angry’ taking of property of 
foreigners where the two (or more) states are involved in political conflict. They suggest 
that expropriation has a harsher tone than nationalization,
22
 but at the same time they 
argue that an important element of the term expropriation is that in such case we assume 
that there is some compensation for the taken property.
23
 In their opinion, nationalization 
is the taking of property on a permanent basis by the government, with the intention to 
become the owner and the operator. In their opinion, it is a softer word than 
expropriation.
24
 Folsom and Gordon assume some kind of conflict between the home 
state of the investor (or the individual investor) and the expropriating state. However, we 
do not find necessary the existence of conflict for expropriation, first of all, because 
                                                          
18
 See RALPH H. FOLSOM & MICHAEL W. GORDON, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 639 (3d ed. 
1995); Sacerdoti even simply defines taking of property as non-commercial risk. See GIORGIO SACERDOTI, 
BILATERAL TREATIES AND MULTILATERAL INSTRUMENTS ON INVESTMENT PROTECTION 380 (1997). 
19
 For example some awards of the Iran – United States Claims Tribunal deliberately confuse these terms. 
See ALLAHYAR MOURI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF EXPROPRIATION AS REFLECTED IN THE WORK OF THE 
IRAN – U. S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 66 (1994); Moreover, in the award Dames and Moore of the Tribunal, the 
two terms (taking and expropriation) were equated. See Dames and Moore v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 4 
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 223 (1985); Pellonpaa and Fitzmaurice in connection with the Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal study use the term taking as “general concept of deprivation by the state of alien-owned property, 
and as such it encompasses both ‘expropriation’ and ‘nationalization’”. See M. Pellonpaa, M. Fitzmaurice, 
Taking of Property in the Practice of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 19 NETHERLANDS YEARBOOK 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 53, 55 (1988). 
20
 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 602 (7
th
 ed. 1999). 
21
 Id. at 1046. 
22
 See RALPH H. FOLSOM, MICHAEL W. GORDON, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 640 (3d ed. 
1995). 
23
 See id. 
24
 See id.  
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regulatory taking is the reason for many expropriations; and also, as usually in the case of 
conflict between the nations, there is no good chance for adequate compensation. 
 
A very simple, but good “textbook” definition of expropriation is given by 
O’Keefe, when he writes that: 
 
Expropriation may be defined as a compulsory acquisition of property by the state. 
Usually this means that the property of a private person is directly taken over by the state, 




Sacerdoti, a European scholar, gives a concise and simple definition. He defines 
expropriation as a “coercive appropriation by the state of private property”.
26
 In his 
opinion, nationalization differs only in the fact that it is directly statutory based and has a 
wider coverage.
27
 He also emphasizes the socio-economic element in the case of 
nationalization.
28
 Though Sacerdoti’s definition seems simple, it touches the heart of the 
matter better. 
 
Another distinguished European commentator in the field, Dolzer, offers a 
different and more ‘modern’ definition of expropriation and nationalization. He defines 
expropriation as “individual measures taken for a public purpose,“ as opposed to 
nationalization, which he defines as “large-scale taking on the basis of an executive or 
legislative act for the purpose of transferring property or interests into the public 
domain.“
29
 In our understanding, the difference is in the scale of the measure and in the 
character of the underlying legislation. In the case of expropriation, it should be based on 
a ‘general’ legislation as opposed to nationalization that is based on ‘specific’ legal act 
which is created with the purpose to take a certain property. In both cases public purpose 
is a precondition and this requirement makes it ‘modern’ not only in the sense that it is 
new (the requirement of public purpose became widely accepted by international law in 
the seventies) but also that it requires justification (the ‘public purpose’) for an act that 
                                                          
25
 See P. O’Keefe, UN Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, 8 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE LAW 
239, 256 (1974). 
26
 See GIORGIO SACERDOTI, BILATERAL TREATIES AND MULTILATERAL INSTRUMENTS ON INVESTMENT 
PROTECTION 379 (1997). 
27
 See id.; Pellonpaa and Fitzmaurice makes similar distinction between the two terms: under expropriation 
is meant “single, more or less isolated deprivation, while the term nationalization denotes large-scale 
takings,…” See M. Pellonpaa, M. Fitzmaurice, Taking of Property in the Practice of the Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal 19 NETHERLANDS YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 53, 55 (1988). 
28
 Brownlie and Kronfol also place the emphasis on the social and economic reform element: 
“Expropriation of one or more major national resources as part of a general programme of social and 
economic reform is now generally referred to as nationalisation or socialisation.” See IAN BROWNLIE, 
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 535 (5
th
 ed. 1998); “[Expropriation is]… the utilization of all 
or part of the means of production in the interests of society and not of private individuals.” See ZOUHAIR 
A. KRONFOL, PROTECTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 20 (1972). In comparison Foighel emphasizes the 
economic element when she writes: “[Nationalization is] the compulsory transfer to the state of private 
property dictated by economic motives and having as its purpose the continued and essentially unaltered 
exploitation of the particular property.” See WE. FOIGHEL, NATIONALIZATION 19 (1957); As O’Keefe places 
the emphasis on both: “[Nationalization] whereby certain industries or means of production, distribution or 
exchange are, in pursuance of social or economic policies, concentrated in public hands.”. See P. O’Keefe, 
UN Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, 8 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE LAW 239, 256 (1974). 
29
 See RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 98 (1995). 
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infringes with one of the oldest human rights, the right to property. Thus, the latter 
definitions are modern, in our opinion, in the sense that they focus on the public interest 
in the case of taking, and also that they suggest some kind of obligation of the state, so 
the state is subjected to the interest of its citizens. 
 
Examining international case law, we can say that there were only a few awards 
that tried to define these terms. For example, the case law of the Iran - United States 
Claims Tribunal is a good example of how inconsequentially these terms are used.
30
 At 
the same time the essence is not in what term is used, but what is understood under the 
concept (which is basically the same here). In Dames and Moore case the claimants filed 
claims for breach of contract, or, as an alternative, for reasonable value of services 
rendered by this corporation.
31
 The Tribunal was of the opinion that: “unilateral taking of 
possession of property and the denial of its use to the rightful owners may amount to 
expropriation”.
32
 Here, the Tribunal used the wording “may amount,” meaning in our 
interpretation that it depended on the circumstances. Here, taking the possession of the 
property and denying the rightful owner the use of it, in the Tribunal’s opinion, was 
sufficient to constitute expropriation. 
 
In another decision, Amoco Int'l Fin. v. Government of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, the Tribunal required “transfer of property rights” from the original owner 
(claimant) to the expropriating state to consider it as taking.
33
 In the opinion of the 
Tribunal, the act of the state is qualified as expropriation only if these rights have been 
transferred.
34
 However, such requirement might be interpreted broadly, and might mean 
that the transfer of all the classical rights related to property are required, which is, in 
fact, a narrow interpretation for the rightful owner and gives more elbow-room to the 
expropriating state. Another decision of the Tribunal raises an interesting question: does 
the expropriated (nationalized) property have to be taken by the state itself to constitute 
expropriation? In the Eastman Kodak Company case,
35
 Judge Brower, an arbitrator in 
Iran – United States Claims Tribunal, formulated the term expropriation as “when the 
state involved has itself acquired the benefit of the affected alien’s property or at least has 
                                                          
30
 The Tribunal itself stated that Claims Settlement Declaration applies equally to expropriation, 
nationalization and other forms of taking not making distinction among these terms, or separately defining 
them. See American International Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 96,101 
(1983). 
31
 The Tribunal found that it has no jurisdiction over the claim and dismissed it. See Dames and Moore v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 220 (1985). 
32
 Dames and Moore v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 223 (1985). 
33




 Eastman Kodak Company claimed that due to the acts of the Government of Iran it lost control over a 
subsidiary in Iran, and that it holds liable the Government of Iran for the debts owed by its subsidiary to 
Eastman Kodak Company. It also alleged that Iran expropriated the subsidiary, and claimed compensation. 
The Tribunal found for the respondent. Charles N. Brower wrote the dissenting opinion. Eastman Kodak 
Company v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 17 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 161 (1985). 
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been the instrument of its redistribution”.
36
 Meaning that the ‘intermediary’ role of the 




We can conclude that both in the case of expropriation and nationalization private 
property is taken by the state on permanent basis. According to some writers, in the case 
of nationalization compensation is, not assumed, however, it is not true in general. In the 
case of expropriation the expropriating state usually provides some compensation. 
Another important difference is that nationalization is usually related to some socio-
economic and/or political changes in the given society, and there is a ‘specific’ 
underlying legislation, while, in case of expropriation, ‘general’ legislation constitutes 
the basis of the taking. 
 
Intervention. Few words should be devoted to the terms intervention and 
confiscation. Intervention means an action of the government, when it assumes control of 
a business (or any other private property) with the intention of operating the business for 
a limited period of time and to achieve a particular goal.
38
 It is important that after a 
reasonable period of time the property gets back to the original owner.
39
 Here the 
question may arise as to what compensation the original owner is entitled to, even if there 
was no expropriation in question. According to experts in the field, owners of such 





Confiscation. Confiscation is taking of property without compensation.
41
 We can 
find some similarities to the definition of nationalization and expropriation, in the sense 
that, in case of confiscation, there always should be underlying public interest (either 
social or economic). Alternatively, Wortley defines confiscation as deliberate seizure of 
property by the state, without providing adequate compensation.
42
 This means that he still 
implies some compensation, however not necessarily ‘adequate’. According to him, 
confiscation also typically implies the denial of any right to restitution or to damages. 
Wortley finds confiscation justifiable by international law only in the following two 
exceptional cases: when there is a forfeiture or a fine to punish or suppress crime
43
, or 
when the loss is indirectly caused by the territorial state imposing legislation restricting 
the use of property, thereby confiscating or limiting rights normally enjoyed by an owner 
                                                          
36
 Eastman Kodak Company v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 17 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 167 (1985). 
37
 Throughout the history there were some takings when the ruling political elite tried to gain supporters by 
‘redistributing’ the property of the old elite to its own supporters. See e.g., Tanzania. 
38
 See RALPH H. FOLSOM & MICHAEL W. GORDON, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 639 (3d ed. 
1995). 
39
 See id. 
40
 See Loukis G. Loucaides, The protection of the right to property in occupied territories 53 ICLQ 677 
(2004); H. LAUTERPACHT ED., OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW II: DISPUTES, WAR AND NEUTRALITY 
234-5 (7TH ED., 1952); However, the right of states for intervention is usually limited by laws that foresee 
compensation (e.g., confiscation of goods during war time).  
41
 See id. at 641; IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 534 (5
th
 ed. 1998). 
42
 See BEN ATKINSON WORTLEY, EXPROPRIATION IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 39 (1959). 
43
 E.g., The Serbian Criminal Code provides the confiscation of goods that result from a criminal delict 




 Wortley is of the opinion that taxation is in no case 
confiscation, as in the case of taxation there is some consideration received for the tax 
paid.
45
 We agree that there is some kind of reward, as taxpayers receive certain services 
for the tax paid. However, there is the case of excessive taxation that, in our opinion, falls 




 Distinction can be made between de jure and de facto 
expropriation (taking).
47
 The host state may take measures which in fact (de facto) 
dispossesses the owner of his property, but legally do not affect the ownership – this is 
called creeping, indirect or de facto expropriation.
48
 Such measures (e.g., requiring 
undue permits, restricting the activities of the business, extensive taxation) may 
significantly reduce the investor’s economic opportunities and prospects of making 
profit. This is the reason why, for example, in bilateral investment treaties investor states 
usually include quite general clauses concerning the definition of expropriation. 
 
Sacerdoti defines creeping expropriation as “measures which, even if they are not 
aimed at transferring property rights, imply an interference with the exercise of such 
rights equivalent to that of a measure of expropriation”
49
. Sacerdoti gives two other 
definitions as well for creeping expropriation. He also defines it as a measure that “do 
not involve an overt taking but that effectively neutralizes the benefit of the property for 
the foreign owner”.
50
 Another definition he uses is a ”progressive erosion of the 
investor’s rights by regulatory measures”.
51
 “Neutralizing the benefits” means that there 
is no chance given to the investor to make profit, although the objective of investments is 
making profit. It can be also defined as loss over the use of the enjoyment of the owner’s 
property, but at the same time the owner does not relinquish the title to the property.
52
 
Examples of creeping expropriation could be excessive taxation, prohibition of dividend 
distribution, refusal of access to raw materials, restricting the repatriation of profits, 
                                                          
44
 See id. 
45
 Wortley cites Adam Smith in support: “Every tax, however, is to the person who pays it a badge, not of 
slavery, but of liberty.” See BEN ATKINSON WORTLEY, EXPROPRIATION IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
39,46 (1959). 
46
 The expression “creeping expropriation” instead of “creeping taking” is used by scholars, thus we use 
this one. 
47
 See RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 99 (1995); ALLAHYAR 
MOURI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF EXPROPRIATION AS REFLECTED IN THE WORK OF THE IRAN – U. S. 
CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 70 (1994). 
48
 See ANDREW NEWCOMBE LLUÍS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 325 (2009); 
RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 100 (1995); According to the 
European Court of Human Rights de facto expropriation occurs when a state deprives the owner of his 
“right to use, let or sell property.” See also Mellacher and Others judgement of 15.12.1989. Mellacher and 
Others v. NN, 20 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 23 (1989). 
49
 See GIORGIO SACERDOTI, BILATERAL TREATIES AND MULTILATERAL INSTRUMENTS ON INVESTMENT 
PROTECTION 383 (1997);  
50
 See id. 382. 
51
 See id. 339. 
52
 Marisa Yee, The Future of Environmental Regulation After Article 1110 of NAFTA: A Look at the 
Methanex and Metalclad Cases, 9 HASTINGS W.-N.W.J. ENV. L. & POL’Y 85, 88 (2002). 
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imposing new labor or local content requirements, etc.
53
 Thus, it would be very difficult 




 We can agree that the issue of indirect or creeping expropriation is a very delicate 
issue, because it is difficult to determine what constitutes such expropriation, and to 
evaluate legal effects of certain measures. The examination of international case law 
might be of some help. For example, in the case law of the Iran – United States Claims 
Tribunal, at first glance it seems that the Tribunal easily solved the problem of definition: 
it stated that the term expropriation covers both de jure and de facto expropriation, that is 
to say, all kinds of taking whether formal and direct or informal and indirect (like 
creeping expropriation).
55
 At the same time, it does not solve the problem of determining 
an action of the state (does not give conditions), if it constitutes de facto expropriation at 
all. Concerning the practice of international tribunals in general, including that of the Iran 
– United States Claims Tribunal, Dolzer, in one of his writings, argues that courts tend to 
bring decisions on the basis of clearly identifiable measures of the host state, and not on 
the basis of general economic or social developments that can be connected to the alien 




Creeping expropriation can also have another important effect on the 
compensation in case of expropriation: it can devalue the property in the state where such 
expropriation happens.
57
 Sometimes only the threat of formal expropriation or further 
regulatory change leads to property devaluation. And taking the advantage of this loss of 





Creeping expropriation in case law. Examining case law, in one of the latest 
awards of the United States-Iran Claims Tribunal, in the Frederica Lincoln Riahi v. the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran case, the Tribunal tries to give a very precise 
                                                          
53
 The Commentary to article 3 of the OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property of 
1967; See also Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 644 (1998). 
54
 The Commentary to article 3 of the OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property of 
1967 defined it as: ”[…] measure otherwise lawful applied in such a way as to deprive ultimately the alien 
of the enjoyment or value of his property, without any specific act being identifiable as outright 
deprivation.”; Article 11.a.ii. of the 1985 MIGA Convention: ”A creeping nationalization would exist 
besides when there is no immediate prospect that the owner will be able to resume the enjoyment of his 
property.” See Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency Info page (visited Aug. 10, 2011) 
<http://www.miga.org/screens/about/about.htm>. 
55
 In Mouri’s opinion, the jurisprudence of the Tribunal shows that “de facto expropriation relates to the 
actual seizure or control over property, coupled with its use by the government or beneficiaries appointed 
by it”. See ALLAHYAR MOURI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF EXPROPRIATION AS REFLECTED IN THE WORK 
OF THE IRAN – U. S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 69 (1994). See also V. Heiskanen, Doctrine of Indirect 
Expropriation in Light of the Practice of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 8 J. World Investment & 
Trade 215, 218-19 (2007). 
56
 Rudolf Dolzer, Indirect Expropriation of Alien Property, 1 ICSID REVIEW 41, 65 (1986). 
57
 See Patrick Del Duca, The Rule of Law: Mexico’s Approach to Expropriation Disputes in the Face of 
Investment Globalization 51 UCLA L. Rev. 35, 56 (2003). 
58
 See id. 
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definition of de facto expropriation.
59
 In this case the claimant (Frederica Lincoln Riahi), 
a United States citizen, filed a claim against the Iranian Government seeking 
compensation for expropriation of her property.60 This property included, among others, 
equity interests in different Iranian businesses.
61
 Concerning de facto expropriation, the 
Tribunal stated in this case that: “[…] measures taken by a state can interfere with 
property rights to such an extent that these rights must be deemed expropriated, even 
though no law or decree was issued in this respect.”
62
 Examples of such taking given by 
the Tribunal are the following: when the owner is deprived of the effective use, control or 
benefits of his/her property. So, expropriation can happen even if the state does not 
formally recognize it, and even if the legal title of the property formally remains with the 
original owner (the one whose property was de facto expropriated).
63
 In the opinion of 
the court, once the owner is deprived of fundamental rights of ownership (provided such 
measures are not temporary, because then it is intervention) the intent of the Government 
is not relevant any more, the factual state of affairs has to be taken into consideration 
when examining whether taking has happened.
64
 This broad interpretation of 
expropriation is supported by some other decisions and authors as well.
65
 However, the 
Tribunal emphasized an additional requirement, that is to say, such action has to be 




It is also worth examining case law of the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) when we talk about the issue of creeping expropriation. In 
one of the latest ICSID cases, the Eudoro Armando Olguin v. Republic of Paraguay 
case,
67
 the claimant argued that Paraguay’s actions, with respect to the claimant’s 
investment, were tantamount to an expropriation.
68
 Olguin alleged that the Republic of 
Paraguay carried out indirect expropriation through a series of omissions like not 
preventing the financial institution, into which Olguin had invested his money, from 
becoming insolvent and from the ongoing economic crisis.
69
 In 1993 E. A. Olguin, a 
citizen both of Peru and the United States, with residence in the United States, transferred 
a certain amount of money to Mercantil, a Paraguayan financial institution, with the 
                                                          
59
 Frederica Lincoln Riahi v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. cite: 
IRAN FINAL AWARD 600-485-1, signed February 27, 2003, filed February 27, 2003. 
60
 Id. para. 1.-40. 
61
 Id. para. 2. 
62
 Id. para. 3. 
63
 Id. para. 344. See also V. Heiskanen, Doctrine of Indirect Expropriation in Light of the Practice of the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 8 J. World Investment & Trade 215, 220 (2007). 
64
 Frederica Lincoln Riahi v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, para. 345. 
65
 E.g., in Otis case the Tribunal was of the opinion that there is expropriation if the claimant proves that 
“[…] its property rights had been interfered with to such an extent that its use of those rights or the 
enjoyment of their benefits was substantially affected and that it suffered a loss as a result [...].” In this 
case, the claimant Otis claimed compensation for its shares expropriated in an Iranian elevator producing 
company. See Iran-US Claims Tribunal Reports 15 (1997) at 220; See also V. Heiskanen, Doctrine of 
Indirect Expropriation in Light of the Practice of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 8 J. World 
Investment & Trade 215, 217 (2007). 
66
 Frederica Lincoln Riahi v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, para. 136-138. 
67
 Yearbook Commercial Arbitration Vol. XXVII – 2002, International Council for Commercial 
Arbitration, Gen. ed. Albert Jan van den Berg, The Hague, 2002 at 48. 
68
 Id. at 55 para 20. 
69
 Id. at 60 para 46. 
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intention of financing an establishment of a corn product plant in Paraguay. Investment 
titles issued by Mercantil on the name of E. A. Olguin were signed by a Banco Central 
del Paraguay official and by an official of the authority supervising financial institutions 
in Paraguay. In 1995, during the financial crisis in Paraguay, Mercantil stopped payments 
under these investment titles. Following this, E. A. Olguin initiated ICSID arbitration 
against the Republic of Paraguay under the Bilateral Investment Protection Treaty 
between Paraguay and Peru claiming that the Republic of Paraguay was responsible for 
unpaid investment titles under the investment protection treaty. The Tribunal dismissed 
E. A. Olguin’s claims. In the award, among others, the Tribunal stated the following: 
 
In expropriation, a person is deprived of a good by an act of the state which appropriates 
this good and is logically bound to pay its price. It cannot be said in this case that 
Paraguay appropriated Olguin’s investment, which was lost in the crisis of La Mercantil 




Furthermore, the Tribunal admitted that there can be cases where the state 
indirectly acquires possession, or at least profits from private property (acknowledging 
the concept of de facto or creeping expropriation). Meanwhile, it also stated that 
“expropriation also requires an intention to expropriate; omissions, serious as they may 




In another case, Compania del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic of 
Costa Rica,
72
 the Tribunal analyzed at some length the notion of “creeping 
expropriation”. Among others, it stated that: 
 
[…] measure or series of measures can still eventually amount to a taking, though the 





It concluded that it is crucial to establish the “extent to which the measures taken 
have deprived the owner of the normal control of his property”.
74
 In Compania del 
Desarrollo, the Tribunal concluded that the expropriation had happened, even though the 
investor remained in possession of his property, but he could not use freely his property 
(for the purpose of commercial development).
75
 Thus, the expropriation is subject to 
compensation when the state’s “interference has deprived the owner of his rights or had 
made those rights practically useless”.
76
 It also established that it is the task of the 




                                                          
70
 Id. at 56 para. 26. 
71
 Id. at 60 para. 47. 
72
 Compania del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica (ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1). 
The award can be found at: ICSID Info page, ICSID Cases (visited on Jan. 24, 2011) 
<http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/santaelena_award.pdf>. 
73
 Id. para. 76. 
74
 Id.  
75
 Id. para. 81. 
76
 Id. para. 78. 
77
 Id. Related to this see Max Gutbrot, Steffen Hindelang, Steffen, Externalization of Effective Legal 
Protection against Indirect Expropriation, 7 J. World Investment & Trade 59, 63 (2006). 
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In Tradex Hellas S.A. v. Republic of Albania case Tradex, a Greek company, 
commenced arbitration proceedings against the Republic of Albania for alleged 
expropriation of an agricultural joint venture in Albania.
78
 Tradex, following negotiations 
with the Albanian Government, entered into a joint-venture (in the field of agricultural 
production) with T.B. Trovitsa, an Albanian state-owned company.
79
 Tradex claimed that 
shortly after the conclusion of the joint-venture agreement, Albania had expropriated 
“substantial” part of the agriculture land owned by the joint-venture and had given it to 
local farmers.
80
 Furthermore, Tradex claimed that, following the grant of land to 
villagers, local farmers stole crops and other property (not expropriated) of the joint-
venture, and the Albanian state did not intervene.
81
 Therefore, Tradex claimed that 
Albania had expropriated its investment.
82
 The Tribunal concluded that Tradex could not 
prove that expropriation occurred, and therefore denied Tradex’s claim.
83
 What is 
relevant to us, is the Tribunal’s interpretation of the provision of the applicable law
84
 that 
states: “foreign investment shall not be expropriated: (1) directly; (2) indirectly; (3) or by 
any measure of tantamount effect.”
85
 Thus, the Tribunal concluded that this provision 
covers: 
 
A wide range of takings and makes it clear that not only government measures expressly 
denominated as ‘expropriations’ or directly taking away all or part of the investment are 
prohibited, but also other measures that indirectly or by their effect lead to the foreign 




 In Tecnicas Medioambientales case
87
, Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. 
(Tecmed), a Spanish company, requested arbitration against Mexico based on the 
bilateral investment treaty concluded between Spain and Mexico.
88
 Tecmed, among 
others, claimed that Mexican authorities had in fact expropriated its investment by 
denying the renewal of the license to operate Tecmed’s landfill.
89
 The claimant also 
argued that not granting the permit deprived the investment of its market value.
90
 The 
respondent argued that it had the discretionary powers for not granting the permit, as it 
was regulatory measure
91
 within the state’s police power.
92
 The Tribunal concluded that 
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PIERNAS (ED.), THE LEGAL PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, 218-22 
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such denial was in fact expropriation of the investment and awarded damages of USD 5.5 
million to the claimant.
93
 As the bilateral investment treaty did not define what is to be 
understood by expropriation, the Tribunal tried to define it. It based the definition of 
expropriation on the opinion of the Tribunal in the Metalclad case and defined 
expropriation as follows: 
 
Although formally an expropriation means a forcible taking by the Government of 
tangible or intangible property owned by private persons by means of administrative or 
legislative action to that effect, the term also covers a number of situations defined as de 
facto expropriation, where such actions or laws transfer assets to third parties different 
from the expropriating state or where such laws or actions deprive persons of their 





As we can see, the Tribunal interpreted the term of expropriation very broadly, 
including de facto taking as well. It also construed terms contained in the treaty like 
“equivalent to expropriation” and “tantamount to expropriation” meaning “indirect 
expropriation”, “creeping expropriation” or “de facto expropriation”.
95
 It set up the 
following test to determine whether not granting of the permit constituted expropriation: 
“[…] if the claimant, […], was radically deprived of the economical use and enjoyment 
of its investment, as if the rights related thereto – […] - had ceased to exist”.
96
 Basically, 
it examined to what extent did the investment lost its “value and economic use”.
97
 It also 
concluded that measures 
 
adopted by a state, whether regulatory or not, are an indirect de facto expropriation if 
they are irreversible and permanent and if the assets or rights subject to such measure 
have been affected in such a way that “…any form of exploitation thereof…” has 
disappeared; i.e. the economic value of the use, enjoyment or disposition of the assets or 





It also stated that: 
 
Under international law, the owner is also deprived of property where the use or 
enjoyment of benefits related thereto is exacted or interfered with to a similar extent, 
even where legal ownership over the assets in question is not affected, and so long as the 
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Furthermore, it concluded that the intention of the government, when 





The case law of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is also 
rather interesting.
101
 In the Metalclad case, a U.S. waste disposal company, Metalclad 
Corporation, initiated arbitration proceedings against Mexico alleging, among others, 
breach of NAFTA articles 1110. Its notice of arbitration asserted that Mexico wrongfully 
refused to permit Metalclad's subsidiary to open and operate a hazardous waste facility 
that the company had built in La Pedrera, despite the fact that the project was allegedly 
executed in response to the invitation of certain Mexican officials and allegedly met all 
Mexican legal requirements.
102
 Metalclad sought damages of USD 43,125,000 and 
damages for the value of the enterprise taken.
103
 In this case, the ICSID Arbitral Tribunal 
interpreted expropriation
104
 as including: 
 
[…] not only open, deliberate and acknowledged takings of property, such as outright 
seizure or formal or obligatory transfer of title in favor of the host state, but also covert or 
incidental interference with the use of property which has the effect of depriving the 
owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic 




The Arbitral Tribunal was of the opinion that Mexico took measures that “amount 
to an indirect expropriation” in violation of article 1110 of NAFTA by allowing and/or 
tolerating
106
 the conduct of the local government.
107
 It also added that the implementation 
of Ecological Decree issued by the local governor, that also affected the rights of 




 This Agreement deals with the issue of foreign direct investment and expropriation of investment in its 
Chapter 11. It distinguishes between ‘direct’ taking and ‘indirect’ taking (and ‘measures tantamount to 
expropriation’). NAFTA Secretariat (visited Nov. 15, 2013) <http://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/DefaultSite/legal/index_e.aspx?articleid=79>. See also on this issue Marc R. Poirier, The NAFTA 
Chapter 11 Expropriation Debate Through the Eyes of a Property Theorist, 33 ENVTL. L. 851, 859-60 
(2003). 
102
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71-90 (2013). 
103
 United States Department of state, Metalclad Corp. (visited on Apr. 27, 2013) 
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Metalclad, would have in itself tantamounted to an act of expropriation. But, even 
without such decree, the events preceding the announcement of the decree (conduct 
described above) themselves constituted expropriation.
108
 However, we have to mention 
that the Supreme Court of British Columbia was in part on different opinion when the 
case reached this court.
109
 It concluded that: 
 
[…] the Tribunal did decide the matter beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration 
when it concluded that the acts preceding the announcement of the Ecological Decree 
amounted to an expropriation within the meaning of article 1110 because it based its 




The Court also found that the Arbitral Tribunal gave “an extremely broad 
definition of expropriation” for the purposes of NAFTA article 1110.
111
 However, as the 
definition of expropriation was a question of law, the Court did not try to define it.
112
 
Finally, the Court concluded that the Arbitral Tribunal was correct when stating that the 
Ecological Decree constituted an act tantamount to expropriation without compensation, 




 Pope and Talbot, Inc. v. Canada is the next NAFTA case worth examining. In this 
case, Pope and Talbot claimed that, by reducing its quota of lumber that could be 
exported to the United States without paying a fee, Canada “had taken actions that so 
extensively interfered with claimant’s Canadian production and exports” that these 
actions were tantamount to expropriation in violation of article 1110.
114
 Pope and Talbot 
based its claim on the following arguments: (i) Canada's export control regime deprived 
the investment of its “ordinary ability” to sell its products to its traditional markets,
115
 (ii) 
expropriation under international law “refers to an act by which governmental authority is 
used to deny some benefit to property”,
116
 (iii) the Canadian action tantamounted to 
expropriation in violation of article 1110.
117
 Pope and Talbot argued that the phrase 
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117
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‘tantamount to expropriation’ expanded to the concepts of indirect taking and creeping 
expropriation, covering even non-discriminatory measures of general application which 
have the effect of substantially interfering with investments of investors.
118
 Canada, in 
contrast, argued that: (i) Pope and Talbot could continue to export lumber, (ii) “mere 
interference is not expropriation; rather, a significant degree of deprivation of 
fundamental rights of ownership is required,”
119
 (iii) ‘tantamount’ simply means 
‘equivalent’ and did not expand article 1110’s coverage beyond creeping expropriation to 
cover regulatory action.
120
 The Tribunal was of the opinion that the investment’s access 
to the U.S. market (meaning that the investor is allowed to invest in the U.S. market) is a 
property interest subject to protection under article 1110.
121
 The Tribunal also rejected 
the claim that “those regulatory measures constitute an interference with the investment's 
business activities substantial enough to be characterized as an expropriation under 
international law”, or that the expression ‘tantamount’ to nationalization or expropriation 
widened the ordinary concept of expropriation under international law.
122
 It was the 
Tribunal’s opinion that ‘tantamount’ means nothing more than equivalent.
123
 The 




Another NAFTA case where article 1110 was scrutinized is the S. D. Myers case. 
S. D. Myers, a U.S. company, was in the business of remediation of hazardous waste. 
Canada had an inventory of waste contaminated with polychlorinated biphenyls. S. D. 
Myers wanted to enter to the business of transporting such waste to the United States. 
There, S. D. Myers planned to recycle the waste, or dispose of it in a safe manner. S. D. 
Myers’ affiliate in Canada was Myers Canada, which also had to be involved in this 
business.
125
 We should mention that S. D. Myers spent considerable effort and money in 
Canada and in the United States to develop its business.
126
 Among others, it lobbied long 
and hard to obtain regulatory approval from U.S. authorities to import waste into the U.S. 
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120
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121
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(2009). 
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It got the permit in 1995. However, immediately after this, Canada imposed a ban on the 
export of PCB wastes into the United States.
127
 The Government of Canada said that it 
had “environmental concerns about the proposed export of PCBs by companies like S.D. 
Myers”.
128
 Following this, S. D. Myers claimed that the export ban amounted in 




In this case, the Tribunal defined the difference between expropriation and 
regulation:  
 
Expropriations tend to be severe deprivations of ownership rights; regulations tend to 
amount to much less interference. The distinction between expropriation and regulation 
screens out most potential cases of complaints about regulatory conduct by the state, and 





The Tribunal further stated that article 1110 of NAFTA applies to indirect 
expropriations or measures tantamount to expropriation, but the phrase ‘tantamount to 
expropriation’ in such case needs deeper scrutiny. The Tribunal examined whether the 
governmental conduct amounted in substance to an expropriation. It concluded that the 
real purpose and impact of a measure must be considered, not merely the official 
explanations offered by the government: 
 
A government might proceed with a gradually unfolding series of disparate measures; 
none of them individually may amount to expropriation, but the whole series might in 
some cases be substantially equivalent to an expropriation. Usually, an expropriation 
amounts to a lasting removal of the ability of an owner to make use of its economic 
rights. The export ban here was temporary. It may be that in some contexts and 
circumstances, it would be appropriate for international law to view a deprivation as 
amounting to an expropriation, even though it is partial or temporary. But the temporary 
nature of the impairment here is one factor, albeit not decisive in itself, in refraining from 








The issue of repudiation or breach of contract by the state. Few words should be 
devoted to the problem of repudiation or breach of contract by states. The issue examined 
here is whether contractual rights can be taken (expropriated) or not. In general, contracts 
between a state and a foreign investor are governed by the municipal law of the host 
state.
133
 From this follows that, if the state breaches the contract, it will not automatically 














 See MARTIN DIXON, TEXTBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 218 (1993); P. O’Keefe, UN Permanent 
Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, 8 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE LAW 239, 254 (1974); A good example 
is China. 
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infer international liability, it will not be in breach of international law per se.
134
 
However, according to Dixon, there are few exceptions.
135
 One of these is the case when 
the investor is prevented from obtaining due process of law, in which case the home state 
of the investor has the right to make an international claim against the state that denied 
the due process of law against the investor. Another exception is when contractual rights 
are regarded as property that may be unlawfully expropriated.
136
 The most interesting 
exception is when the contract becomes ‘internationalized’. This can be achieved with a 
so-called stabilization clause in the contract.
137
 Such clauses provide that, even if the 
legislation is changed after the signature of the investment contract, only that law applies 
to the investment contract and to the investment that was in force at the time of signing 
the contract. If the state agrees to add such a clause to the contract, it becomes an 
international obligation, and it may mean that property or property rights connected to 




 The case law of the Iran – United States Claims Tribunal also supports that 
contractual rights can be expropriated. In the Mobil Oil case, a consortium of companies 
negotiated a 20 years long concession agreement in 1973 for purchase of crude oil 
produced in Iran. Following the revolution in 1980 the Revolutionary Council of Iran 
nullified the concession contract.
139
 One of the issues in this case was whether Iran had 
breached the concession agreement, and, with this, unlawfully expropriated property 
interest of the company.
140
 The Tribunal found Iran liable and stated that a concession 





In Phillips Petroleum Co. Iran (claimant) v. Islamic Republic of Iran case, the 
claimant, a Delaware corporation, had rights to explore and exploit petroleum resources 
in Iran on the basis of the contract signed with the National Iranian Oil Company in 1965. 
Following the Iranian revolution,
142
 the Government of Iran declared these contracts null 
and void ab initio.
143
 The claimant asked for compensation on the basis of expropriation 
of contractual rights.
144
 However, the Tribunal was of the opinion that if there is liability, 
it should be assessed on the basis of taking of foreign property in international law. 
Finally, the Tribunal found Iran liable for taking of contractual rights, maintaining that: 
“expropriation by or attributable to a state of the property of an alien gives rise under 
international law to liability [...] whether the property is tangible, […], or intangible, such 
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 Id. para. 75. 
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as the contract rights […]”.
145
 These cases of the Tribunal strengthen the proposition that 
not only tangible assets but also contractual rights can be expropriated.
146
 This is based 
on the above findings and on other case law and academic literature that will be 




Conclusion. We can see that there are many different definitions for the terms 
mentioned above: taking, expropriation, nationalization, intervention, confiscation and 
creeping expropriation. Generally, we may conclude that capital exporting countries try 
to define the term taking (expropriation, nationalization) as general as possible, while 
capital importing countries try to give an interpretation to the term as narrow as possible. 
As we could see, in common usage, the term expropriation is used both in wide and 
narrow sense, as an individual measure for a public purpose, generally decided on the 
basis of a pre-existing law. Nationalization is a matter of public policy concerning a 
state’s internal order. It may affect a whole branch of the economy or some of the major 
enterprises. 
 
Defining these terms should be the first and basic step towards a secure legal 
environment for foreign investors. These investors want to have clear and internationally 
valid definitions and rules that will protect their investments to the maximum extent 
possible. 
 
In the following chapters we will study three issues of dominant importance that 
arise in connection with taking, and which constitute the core of the work: the issue of the 
right to take property, the issue of non-discrimination, and the issue of compensation. 
Each of the foregoing issues will be discussed in a separate chapter. 
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The Right to Take Property and the Public Purpose 
 
Introduction. Before examining the requirements of taking of foreign property in 
international law, a short overview of the rules of customary international law will be 
given regarding the treatment of foreigners, and accordingly, the treatment of foreign 
investors. These rules are mainly derived from the practice of states,
148
 which means they 
are not uniform.
149
 First of all, it is apparent under international customary law that in 
principle (historically) there is no obligation to admit foreigners to the territory of 
sovereign states.
150
 From this follows that, theoretically, there is also no obligation on the 
state to allow foreigners to undertake investments on their territory. However, if they do, 
it should be borne in mind that foreign investors, as a general rule, are subject to local 
laws.
151
 Of course, states can voluntarily limit their sovereignty through treaties,
152
 and, 
in this case, investors are also subject to treaties, conventions and, in some cases, even to 
contracts concluded between investors and the host state. In general, according to 
international law, sovereign states have the right to expropriate foreign property under 
certain conditions.
153
 This is supported by several international documents and 
agreements. The General Assembly Resolution 1803 on Permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources is one of the first documents of the United Nations that laid down the 
right of sovereign states to take property. In its Preamble, it emphasizes the right of 
sovereign nations to dispose with their natural resources. In its article IV, it explicitly 
grants the right to states to expropriate foreign property.
154
 Another important document 
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of the United Nations was the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International 
Economic Order of 1974. This document reinforces the rights granted by the General 
Assembly Resolution 1803 as to “full permanent sovereignty of every state over its 
natural resources and all economic activities”. To achieve this end, the Declaration 
empowers sovereign states to “nationalize or to transfer [the] ownership to its 
nationals”.
155
 We assume that the expression ‘to its nationals’ in the provision of this 
document must have been inserted to emphasize that, primarily, the property of foreign 
nationals is targeted by taking, as, in these countries, mostly the property of the ex-
colonizers and foreign investors had been taken. This attitude was the result of social 
justice promotion efforts of newly de-colonized countries.
156
 Taking of foreign property 
was one of the tools for promotion of this ‘justice’. Newly de-colonized countries 
internationally declared and succeeded to make the international community to accept the 
right of sovereign states to take property of foreigners. However, this principle is still 
valid nowadays. Another international document of importance for the issue of right of 
sovereign states to take private property is the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States of 1974, which states in its article 2 that ”each state has the right: […] to 
nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property, [...]”.
157
 These 
documents constitute strong basis and support for our claim that sovereign states have the 
right to take private property, as they are primary sources of international law. However, 
states should be liable for the taking of foreign property both under national and 
international law.
158
 At the same time, it should be mentioned that a distinction can be 
made between responsibility for lawful and unlawful acts of states according to technical 
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literature in the field.
159
 The basic assumption is that sovereign states can take foreign 
property lawfully only under well-established conditions in international law.
160
 At the 
beginning, there was no accord regarding these conditions. The United States Supreme 
Court stated in 1964 that: “There are few if any issues in international law today on 
which opinion seems to be so divided as the limitations on a state’s power to expropriate 
the property of aliens.”.
161
 Circumstances have changed since then, and, respecting 
certain requirements, sovereign states have the power to take the property of foreigners. 
These requirements are the following: the taking has to serve public purpose, has to be 
non-discriminatory, accompanied by appropriate compensation and due process of law 
should be guaranteed for the investor whose property is taken.
162
 If these conditions are 
not fulfilled, the assumption is that the taking is unlawful.
163
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The standards of treatment of foreign investors. The standard of treatment of 
foreign investors is closely related to the issue of conditions of taking. The strong 
protection of private property, as well as property of foreigners, that came into existence 
in the 19th century, has lost its strength following the Russian Soviet Revolution, with the 
spread of leftist ideas. Therefore, it was desirable for capitalist states to develop and 
promote in international law the so-called minimum standard of protection of 
foreigners.
164
 According to this theory, there are rights created and defined by 
international law: once a state lets the investor and his investment to enter the country, it 
has to ensure for the investor and his investment the same protection as it ensures for its 
own citizens, and the investor, in addition, has the right for protection that is considered 
fair and equitable under international law. These rights may be claimed by or on behalf 
of aliens who were lawfully admitted to the state and acquired property.
165
 According to 
this standard, foreigners should be treated in a fair and equitable manner.
166
 The theory 
of minimum standard rejects the Calvo Doctrine, according to which aliens have only the 
same rights as local nationals.
167
 This standard requires more than national treatment of 
foreign investors, because sometimes, national treatment of private property can be poor 
(e.g., Cuba). In other words, the investment recipient state has to respect minimal 
international norms (international public order), irrespectively of what is allowed by the 
municipal law concerning the treatment of its own citizens in the case of taking.
168
 States 
that do not respect these basic principles of minimum standard, and thus harm foreign 




A similar standard to the minimum standard mentioned above is the standard of 
equitable treatment. This requires states to apply their law in a “fair, reasonable, 
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equitable and adequate manner” to foreigners.
170
 Both of these standards could be applied 
without any treaty provision among states. 
 
There is also a standard, called the standard of national treatment in international 
law that is a special one, in connection with the treatment of foreign investors, which can 
be applied only on treaty basis (an exception might be if the host state unilaterally grants 
this treatment). Under this treatment, investors should not have less favorable treatment 




The standard of most favored treatment requires that all the benefits conceded to 
any other investor in the host state, also have to be given to the investor under most 
favored treatment.
172
 This treatment can be of crucial importance if there is a strong 




Finally, preferential treatment is a kind of exception to the most favored 




Both international multilateral instruments and bilateral treaties are based on the 




It has to be noted, regarding these international standards of treatment of foreign 
investors, that different states apply (depending on whether they are investment 
expropriating or investor states) different standards. These standards are laid down in 
international bilateral or multilateral treaties concluded between parties. 
 
Public purpose. It is seldom disputed by international legal literature that lawful 
taking should be only for public purpose.
176
 Many other international documents, like 
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multilateral and bilateral treaties, mention this requirement explicitly and, almost without 
exception, require the existence of public purpose in the case of taking. This requirement 
is not only widely accepted in legal doctrine, but has also found expression in state 
practice.
177
 Some documents use the expression public interest, general interest or public 
utility instead of public purpose with the same meaning. For example, the First Protocol 
to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, article 
1 (Protection of property) states that: 
 
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No 
one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the 





However, more important issue is what is covered by this concept (i.e., these 
terms), than what term is used to express it. It is still not clear in international law what 
should be understood under public purpose, that is to say, what is covered by this 
concept. International legal instruments do not define this term. Therefore, in the 
following we try to find the answer to the question who and on the basis of what and how 
determines what is public purpose. First, let us see what does the academic literature say 
about this issue. Some authors argue that public purpose must principally be directed 
toward improving the quality of life in the nation.
179
 It might be defined as well as the 
improvement of the social welfare or economic betterment of the nation.
180
 As a matter of 
fact, public purpose is somehow defined in almost all legal systems in legal norms in a 
certain way (however, it should be noted that these are not international but national legal 
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 In the United States, the legislative defines what is considered public 
purpose, and when there is a dispute, courts have the power to decide on it.
182
 Black’s 
Law dictionary defines public purpose as ”an action by or at the direction of a 
government for the benefit of the community as a whole”.
183
 We agree with authors who 
claim that states have to exercise good faith concerning the issue and definition of public 
purpose when taking foreign property.
184
 For example, Sacerdoti argues that although 
public purpose (interest) is superior to contractual undertakings towards private parties, 





Many times, foreign investors argue that public purpose should be defined by 
international law, as this might be more favorable for them when it comes to taking of 
their property in the host state. We are of the opinion that international law should have 
some kind of rational public purpose definition laid down in an international instrument 
that is accepted by the international community. Under rational public purpose we 
understand reasons that are beneficial for the wider society, respecting human rights. For 
example, Resolution of the United Nations on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources (1962) states that nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning “shall be 
based on grounds or reasons of public utility, security or the national interest which are 
recognized as overriding purely individual or private interests, both domestic and 
foreign”.
186
 This provision defines public interest broadly, including public utility, 
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well nigh conclusive. In such cases the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public 
needs to be served by social legislation, whether it [467 U.S. 229, 240] […] be Congress legislating 
concerning the District of Columbia [..] or the States legislating concerning local affairs.[…] This principle 
admits of no exception merely because the power of eminent domain is involved.[…].” Id., at 32 (citations 
omitted). HAWAII HOUSING AUTHORITY v. MIDKIFF, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
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security and national interest. It is also good that individual interests are expressly 
excluded by the wording of the Resolution. A similar definition of public purpose could 
be acceptable in our opinion when foreign property is taken by sovereign states. 
 
Important issue is who determines what falls under public purpose (public 
interest, etc.) if the term is not defined, defined vaguely or if there is a dispute regarding 
it. And also the basis on which it should be construed. Should it be the court of the host 
state, the court of the state of origin of the investor or maybe some international judicial 
body? 
 
Case law. One of the cases dealing with the issue of public purpose is the case of 
James and others v. the United Kingdom. In this case, James and others represented the 
Westminster Family Trust against the United Kingdom. A legislative act of the United 
Kingdom entitled tenants (only with long term lease contract) of certain properties owned 
by the Trust to become owners on price determined on the basis of conditions given by 
the legislation. In many cases, the Trust (lessor) provided the land for the tenants 
(lessees) to build houses on it on their own cost, which did not become their property. 
They were only leasing it on long term. As the property of the Westminster family was 
affected by this legislation, the representatives of the Family Trust claimed that the 
compulsory transfer was against article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention.187 
The European Court on Human Rights ruled for the defendant, and stated that: “Because 
of their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, the national authorities are in 
principle better placed than the international judge to appreciate what is in the public 
interest.”.
188
 The only limit set up by the court was that this appreciation has to “[…] 
respect the legislature’s judgment as to what is ‘in the public interest’ unless that 
judgment be manifestly without reasonable foundation”.
189
 The judgment clearly supports 
the idea that public purpose should be determined by national courts based on the norms 




Examining further international case law, we can see that it also supports the 
assumption that one of the prerequisites for lawful taking is the existence of a public 
purpose.
191
 However, similarly to the case above, the definition of public purpose is not 
always clear. Thus, some awards of the Iran - US Claims Tribunal expressly state that it 
is in the ambit of the host state to determine this term.
192
 Therefore it is not easy to cast 
doubt on the existence of this requirement in certain cases, as it would be, at the same 
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time, question of the policy of a sovereign state.
193
 Thus, international tribunals usually 




However, returning to the practice of the Iran – United States Tribunal, on the 
bases of the examined cases, we can say that the existence of public purpose was always 
required, but did not play a decisive role, as it was rarely used as base of dispute.
195
 At 
the same time, the Tribunal confirmed the continuing existence of this requirement.
196
 
For example, in the American International Group case,
197
 the Tribunal stated that it 
cannot be held that the “[…] nationalization of Iran America was by itself unlawful, 
either under customary international law or under the Treaty of Amity […], as there is not 
sufficient evidence before the Tribunal to show that the nationalization was not carried 
out for a public purpose as part of a larger reform program […]“. 
 
In the case of the Amoco International Finance Corporation the Tribunal stated 
that there is no definition for public purpose “agreed upon in international law nor even 
suggested”.198 Furthermore, it stated that “as a result of the modern acceptance of the right 





Similar view was taken in the INA Corporation and Islamic Republic of Iran case 
regarding the requirement of existence of public purpose.
200
 In 1981 INA Corporation 
(INA), a United States corporation incorporated under the laws of Pennsylvania, filed 
with the Tribunal a claim for compensation for the expropriation of its 20 percent 
shareholding in Bimeh Shargh (public joint-stock company) (Shargh), an Iranian 
insurance company. INA claimed USD 285,000 representing what it alleged to be the 
going concern value of its shares, together with interest at 17 percent and legal costs. The 
issue in this case was not if expropriation happened, but the determination of the level of 
compensation for the taken property. At the same time, in the INA Corporation case, the 
separate opinion of Judge Lagergren clearly states the requirement of public purpose: “It 
is generally accepted that some types of expropriation are inherently unlawful - among 
these one can cite cases in which foreign assets are taken […] for something other than a 
public purpose”.
201
 However, this case did not deal with the issue of who determines 
what is considered to be public purpose. 
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In the case law of the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 
the issue of public purpose (or public interest) was raised in the Tecmed case. In this case 
Mexico claimed that, because of the existence of public purpose (environmental 
regulation) it is not obliged to pay compensation. In a certain way, the Mexican State 
misused the requirement of public purpose, interpreting it as an excuse for not paying 
compensation. The Tribunal was of the opinion that the environmental regulation was 
itself an expropriation. However, the fact that the proprty was taken for environmental 
reasons was only one of the requirements of lawful expropriation – i.e., this was the 
public purpose requirement. Thus, the Tribunal stated that: 
 
Expropriatory environmental measures – no matter how laudable and beneficial to 
society as a whole – are, in this respect, similar to any other expropriatory measures that a 
state may take in order to implement its policies: where property is expropriated, even for 




 However, the Tribunal did not give any definition regarding public purpose and 
no other ICSID case was found during the research, where the issue of public purpose 
was raised. 
 
Wilson, an American author, examined the issue of the definition of public 
purpose in connection with the Ethyl Corporation v. Canada, a NAFTA case. Invoking 
Shrybman, he stated that public purpose might have broad application and concludes that 




Conclusion. On the basis of the foregoing, we can conclude that the requirement 
of public purpose, in the case of taking foreign property, undoubtedly exists in 
international law. In practice, many different expressions are used to denote public 
purpose; however, it is generally of no relevance. The real issue is how to define public 
purpose. We have seen that there is no general definition of public purpose in 
international law. The determination of what is considered public purpose is left to 
national legal systems and national courts. Thus, it seems that sovereign states have broad 
power to determine the content of public purpose based on legislative norm in good faith. 
The examined case law also supports our findings. The little case law that is related to 
this issue show that courts and tribunals are reluctant to re-examine the definition of 
public purpose given by state legislations. However, it has to be based on legislation 
respecting the principle of good faith. We have also noticed that, in the case of 
expropriation, public purpose is the least tested requirement of all. 
 
 Considering all the arguments, we believe that it would be useful to have some 
kind of definition of public purpose created and accepted by the wider international 
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community that would give an unambiguous definition of public purpose or at least clear 





The Principle of Non-discrimination 
 
Introduction. In this chapter, we will show that the principle of non-
discrimination, as a requirement in the case of taking foreign property, is a generally 
accepted principle in international law. Non-discrimination is, in fact, the principle of 
equal treatment in international law expressed in negative form. As regards to the 
requirement of non-discrimination, a specific question is whether this treatment should be 
applied to the relationship between nationals and foreigners, between foreigners and 
foreigners or to both relationships. In our opinion, and also in the opinion of some 
authors, in both cases discriminative treatment tends to be considered forbidden under 
international law.204 Otherwise, the basic principle of freedom of competition would be 
infringed. Thus, we can talk about discrimination if the measure is directed against a 
particular party, and for reasons unrelated to the substance of the matter, persons in the 
same situation are treated in a not equivalent manner.205 
 
The principle of non-discrimination. Based on our research (documents referred 
to in this very chapter), we found that discriminatory treatment of foreign investment, in 
the case of taking foreign property, is not accepted. However, it should be mentioned that 
opinions regarding the issue of non-discrimination were not as uniform a few decades 
ago as they are nowadays. Following the Second World War, when many former colonies 
became independent, there were some opinions in international legal literature that 
supported discrimination with the following justification: 
 
[D]eveloping countries, which had to rebuild their national economies from the legacy 
left by colonialism, were not prepared to accept, equally with the highly developed 
countries, an obligation to guarantee the same economic rights to their nationals and to 
non-nationals. That was not discrimination; but it would be discrimination to compel 
countries of unequal strength to carry the same load. The developing countries held 
inevitably to correct the consequences of the discrimination practiced under the colonial 
regime by taking certain measures which might conflict with the interests of a privileged 
minority.
206 
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In our understanding, this is a certain kind of affirmative action that is aimed to 
restore equality between newly de-colonized countries and developed countries. 
However, such arguments are more socio-political considerations than legal, and 
therefore cannot give legal foundation for discriminatory taking. Moreover, in our 
opinion, such discriminatory treatment can lead to unjust economic advantages and unfair 
competition both on local and global levels. Such socio-political considerations must be 
the reason why the United Nations Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties do not mention the principle of 
non-discrimination.
207
 The issue of discrimination was a very sensitive one in the decades 
following the de-colonization. Capital exporting countries secured non-discriminatory 
treatment for their investors through bilateral investment treaties. A good example is the 
United States of America. This way, newly de-colonized countries preserved their face 
and, at the same time, complied with the requirements of investors. 
 
Contrarily to developing countries, American and other western authors 
emphasize the importance of the principle of non-discrimination when taking foreign 
property.
208
 The reason must be that the United States is the biggest foreign investor in 
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the world, and therefore, it is of crucial importance for it to get equal treatment with other 
investors. Besides, as already mentioned, discriminatory treatment disables free 
competition. 
 
Case law. The existence of the requirement of non-discrimination is confirmed by 
international case law.
209
 However, it has to be admitted that, during our research, we 
found only a few cases dealing with this issue. At the same time, none of these cases 
rebutted the principle of non-discrimination. 
 
In one of the cases of the Iran - US Claims Tribunal, the Amoco International 
Finance Corporation case, the Tribunal stated that discrimination is “widely held as 
prohibited by customary international law in the field of expropriation”.
210
 In this case, 
Amoco, an American corporation, had a joint-venture (Khemco) with the Iranian 
National Petrochemical Company (NPC) in the petrochemical industry.
211
 Following the 
Iranian revolution, all American interests in petrochemical joint-ventures were 
expropriated, including that of Amoco.
212
 Whereas, in another of NPC's joint-venture 
with a Japanese company, the Japanese share was not taken.
 213
 Therefore, Amoco argued 
that the fact that another joint-venture in the same economic branch had not been taken is 
discriminatory and therefore it had been unlawful expropriation.
214
 In its decision the 
Tribunal accepted that the principle of non-discrimination should be respected in the case 
of expropriation of foreign property, however, at the same time, it stated that 
characteristics of some cases could justify different treatment: 
 
The Tribunal finds it difficult, in the absence of any other evidence, to draw the 
conclusion that the expropriation of a concern was discriminatory only from the fact that 
another concern in the same economic branch was not expropriated. Reasons specific to 
the non-expropriated enterprise, or to the expropriated one, or to both, may justify such a 
difference of treatment…. In the present Case, the peculiarities discussed by the Parties 
can explain why IJPC was not treated in the same manner as Khemco. The Tribunal 




The ‘peculiarities’ referred to by the Tribunal were the two issues brought by the 
defendant as defense. The first one is that the operation of the IJPC joint venture was not 
closely linked with other contracts relating to the exploitation of oil fields, whereas the 
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operation of the Khemco plant was linked to the supply of gas from the oil fields operated 
jointly by Amoco and NIOC.
216
 The second, that the Japanese-Iranian joint-venture was 
not yet an operational concern at the relevant time.
217
 In our opinion, these are weak 
arguments. First of all, both companies were working (or at least were planning to work) 
in the same economic branch. Thus, we should not place emphasis on the fact that the 
Japanese joint-venture did not conclude specific contracts for the supply of gas. And 
secondly, the joint-venture was existing legally between the Japanese and the Iranian 
company, whether operating or not at the relevant time. However, it might easily be that 
the reason why it was not operating was the political situation in Iran. 
 
In another case, the one of the INA Corporation, the issue was not the non-
discrimination requirement. However, the separate opinion of Judge Lagergren clearly 
refers to the requirement of non-discrimination as one of the requirements of lawful 
taking of foreign property: “It is generally accepted that some types of expropriation are 





Conclusion. Based on the findings above, it can be concluded that the principle of 
non-discrimination, in the case of taking of foreign property is a generally accepted 
principle of international law nowadays. Though, during the sixties and seventies, 
following the last phase of de-colonization, there were views that, under certain 
circumstances, discrimination may be allowed. However, the majority of authors support 
the idea that discriminatory taking of foreign property is unlawful. This is not only 
supported by legal writers, but also by international multilateral and bilateral treaties, and 
the related case law examined. 
 
 In a free market economy, discrimination is impediment to free competition. 
Notwithstanding, such discriminatory treatment happens usually when a government 
wants to win the political support of its own nationals, strengthen national economy, or 
simply needs revenue by expropriating foreign property. At the same time, there are also 
examples for discrimination between foreigners, e.g., when the government prefers and 
treats better strategic investors or investors from countries with political influence on the 
expropriating government. However, on long term, it cannot be profitable. 
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 In this case, following the revolution, the Iranian state expropriated the share (20%) owned by INA 
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Compensation for the taken property 
 
Development of compensation theories. As it has been already showed in previous 
chapters, the right of sovereign states to exercise power on their territory and to take 
(expropriate) foreign property is recognized in international law. That is to say, we 
proceed from the assumption that the majority of states
219
 recognize the lawfulness of 
expropriation provided the taking is non-discriminatory, there is a public purpose and 
there is compensation for the taken property.
220
 In the previous chapters, we have seen 
several proofs that the existence of public purpose and of non-discrimination is an 
indispensable requirement of lawful taking of foreign property. In this chapter, we will 
examine what standards of compensation exist as requirement of lawful taking, and if 
there is common agreement in international law on this issue. Indeed, the majority of 
states recognize that some form of compensation is due for taken foreign property. The 
dispute is usually about the standard of compensation.
221
 Therefore, in the following, the 
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emphasis will be placed on the analysis of the standard of compensation in the case of 
taking foreign property. 
 
In the first part of this chapter, we will examine the development of compensation 
theories and the current state of international law concerning the issue of compensation in 
the case of taking property of foreign investors. The development of compensation 
theories will be examined through the two most important international landmark cases 
(the Norwegian Shipowners’ Claim Case and the Chorzow Factory Case), the Hull and 
Calvo Doctrines and the documents of the United Nations related to the protection of 
foreign property. Following this, we will give a general overview of the current state of 
international law and practice in the field, with special emphasis on the Restatement of 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States and the work of the Iran – United States 
Claims Tribunal. During this examination, besides international legal sources and the 
above-mentioned ones, the opinion of distinguished authors in the field of international 
law will be invoked. This historical overview will help us to find out what compensation 
standard is the most acceptable and recognized in international law. 
 
Many issues and questions can arise in connection with compensation; however it 
is beyond the scope of this book to examine all these issues. Thus, we will concentrate 
only on the most important ones when focusing on the development of compensation 
theories. The first of these will be the issue of the applicable law (whether this is the law 
of the host state, the investor’s home state or maybe some other source of law). The next 
important issue will be the standard of compensation. There is a strong interdependence 
between the standard of compensation and the method of valuation, thus the issue of 
valuation standard will be also examined. And finally, we will take a look at the form and 
the time of payment of the compensation. We begin our discussion with the first 
landmark case in the history of the development of compensation standards in 
international law. 
 
Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims case – ‘just’ compensation. The first well-known 
international case related to compensation of expropriated foreign property was the 
Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims case, in which the arbitrators decided that just 
compensation should be paid.
222
 In 1917 the United States entered the First World War. 
The President of the United States was authorized to order the cancellation of 
shipbuilding contracts, the taking of legal title to ships and the requisition of shipyards in 
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the United States in return for just compensation.
223
 This action affected Norwegian ship 
owners as well, who were promised just compensation for the physical property taken.
224
 
However, Norway claimed compensation also for the affected contractual rights.
225
 The 
Tribunal was of the opinion that contracts were also taken, not only physical property;
226
 
and that this taking was exercise of the power of eminent domain under the United States 
law.
227
 Regarding the applicable law, the United States claimed that its municipal law 
should be applied; while Norway was of the opinion that it was the international law.
228
 
The Tribunal stated that as long as international public order is not violated thereby, the 
municipal law of the United States was applicable.
229
 Concerning the issue of 
compensation, the Tribunal accepted that just compensation was due, however it 
interpreted it as: “Just compensation implies a complete restitution of the status quo ante, 
based, not upon future gains of the United States or other powers, but upon the loss of 
profits of the Norwegian owners as compared with other owners of similar property. 
[emphasis added].”.
230
 The Tribunal also stressed that Norway was a friendly nation and 
that there were no extraordinary circumstances that would warrant the disregard of due 
process of law in the course of the taking.
231
 Discussing the amount and time of 
compensation, the Tribunal added that Norway was entitled to immediate and full 
compensation.
232
 The Tribunal, furthermore, stated that the value of the claimants’ initial 
property should be determined by the standard of fair market value.
233
 Finally, about 
USD 15 million was awarded, a sum which included interest.
234
 From the fact that the 
Tribunal ordered the respondent to pay the compensation in US Dollars we can infer that 
the form of compensation fulfilled the criterion of effectiveness, that is to say, it was in a 
                                                          
223
 Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims Case (Nor. v. U.S.), 1 Reporters of International Arbitral Awards (UN) 
314-18 (1948). 
224
 Id. at 318-25. 
225
 Compensation offered by the United States for the physical property taken was only approximately USD 
2.7 million, while the amount claimed by Norway amounted to about USD 18 million. See id. at 313-14. 
226
 “It is common ground that the word ‘property’ in the fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, 
is treated as a word of most general import, and that it is liberally construed and includes every so called 
‘interest’ in the thing taken. [emphasis added]” See id. at 332. 
227
 “1… the United States took, both in fact and in law, the contracts under which the ships in question were 
being or were to be constructed.  
2. That in fact the claimants were fully and for ever deprived of their property and that this amounts to a 
requisitioning by the exercise of the power of eminent domain within the meaning of American municipal 
law.” See id. at 325.  
228
 See id. at 330. 
229
 See id. at 331. 
230
 See id. at 338. 
231
 See id. at 338-39. 
232
 See id. at 340. 
233
 See id. Investorwords Dictionary defines fair market value as: “The price that an interested but not 
desperate buyer would be willing to pay and an interested but not desperate seller would be willing to 
accept on the open market assuming a reasonable period of time for an agreement to arise.“ (visited on Dec. 
14, 2012) <http://www.investorwords.com/cgi-bin/getword.cgi?1878>; or Money Glossary defines it as: 
“Fair market value is the price, in cash or equivalent, that a buyer could be expected to pay, and a seller 
could be expected to accept, if the asset were exposed for sale on the open market for a reasonable period 
of time, both buyer and seller being knowledgeable of the facts, and neither being under any compulsion to 
act.” (visited on Dec. 14, 2012) <http://www.moneyglossary.com/?w=Fair+Market+Value>. 
234
 See Dolzer, Rudolf: Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims Arbitration in Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law, ed.: Rudolf Bernhardt, Elsevier Science B.V.: Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 1997, Vol. 3, 693. 
 41 
realizable form. It should be mentioned that the United States complied with the arbitral 
award, however, it officially denied its precedential value in international law.
235
 Based 
on this landmark case, we can establish that just compensation means complete 
restitution of the taken property, including the lost profit. 
 
Chorzow Factory case – ‘fair’ compensation. The next landmark case in the 
history of compensation for taken foreign property was the Chorzow Factory case in front 
of the Permanent Court of International Justice.
236
 The subject matter of this case was the 
land in Chorzow on which a nitrate factory had been established. The land was originally 
registered in the name of Germany. However, Germany conveyed the land and the 
factory to Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke AG in 1919.
237
 Following the First Word 
War, the region of Chorzow was transferred from German to Polish control. Under the 
Geneva Convention, countries that took over German territory had the right to seize 
certain land property on these territories owned by the Government of Germany and 
credit the value of this property to Germany's reparation obligations.
238
 Disputes arising 
under the Convention were to be referred to the Permanent Court of International 
Justice.
239
 Shortly after Poland took over Chorzow, a Polish court decreed in 1922 that 
the land belonging to Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke AG should be assigned to Poland, 
as Poland argued that the property belonged to the German State, and that it was not the 
private property of the above-mentioned company.
240
 The dispute finally reached the 
Permanent Court of International Justice. The Court concluded that the land was privately 
owned at the time of taking, and that Poland had seized private property that was not 
lawful according to international law.
241
 The Court stated that the rules of law governing 
the reparation were the rules of public international law in force between the two states 
concerned, and not the law governing relations between the state which committed the 
wrongful act and the individual who suffered damage.
242
 This case sets forth the basic 
principles that govern reparation after the breach of an international obligation.
243
 It gives 
priority to restitution in kind, however, if it is not possible, it turns to the solution of 
monetary compensation.
244
 Thus, concerning the question of compensation, the Court 
stated that “reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the 
illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that 
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act had not been committed”.
245
 The Court qualified the Polish measure as “seizure of 
property”, and in its opinion there was only one remedy for such an act, that is fair 




 Related to this, Dinah Shelton argues 
that one widely accepted form of reparation is correcting the injustice done by restoring 
the status quo ante.
248
 Shelton further argues that the objective of reparation is “to place 
the aggrieved party in the same position as if no wrongful act had occurred, without 
respect to the cost or consequences for the wrongdoer”.
249
 This principle was also the 
basis of the Chorzow decision.
250
 Furthermore, it is interesting to analyze issues 
concerning valuation raised by the Court and referred to by experts. Thus, the Court 
asked experts to determine the value of the property not on the date on which the Polish 
Treasury was registered as owner
251
, but when the Treasury de facto took possession of 
the factory.
252
 According to our opinion, the original owner, the German company, 
should have been entitled to compensation not from this date (de facto taking), but from 
the date when the Polish Treasury was registered as the owner of the factory. The reason 
is, that already following the registration of the Treasury as owner (without taking it de 
facto), the German owner could no longer dispose of the property (e.g., could not sell it 
or use it as collateral). Another remarkable issue is that the Court asked for the 
determination of the value of the property on a very broad basis, that is to say, including 
even goodwill and future prospects of the factory concerned.
253
 The Court also requested 
experts to determine financial results of the undertaking from the time of the taking until 
the time of the judgment, instead of determining the value of the taken property at the 
time of the taking along with the interest from that time.
254
 It also ordered the 
determination of the present value plus, among others, the company’s future prospects.
255
 
Practically, the Court was of the opinion that there should be full compensation (what in 
the Court’s opinion equaled fair compensation), including lucrum cessans
256
, less the 
amount of the maintenance of the factory.
257
 All in all, the Court stated that it would fix 
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the amount of the compensation, the conditions and form of payment in a future 
judgment. It indicated that compensation can be paid in the form of a lump sum, and set 
off might be possible; However, it did not make a concrete decision on the matter.
258
 
Finally, the parties reached a compromise, and the Court terminated the proceedings in 
1929.
259
 Based on this case, we can say that fair or full compensation does not differ 
much from the just compensation standard examined in the Norwegian Shipowners’ 
Claims case. Basically, both cases require, in the case of taking foreign property, in 
integrum restitutio, taking into consideration the lost profits of the owner of the taken 
property.
260
 In both cases, the valuation is based on fair market value of the taken 
property. In our opinion, applying these standards, these early cases of international law 
already offered strong protection of foreign investment. These cases also recognized that 
if in kind restitution is not possible, monetary compensation is the most practical. On the 
basis of the before-said, we can conclude that these decisions use, in fact, different terms 
for the same concept. This supports our assumption that, many times, terms (expressions) 
in international law cannot be defined until they are tested in practice by courts or 
tribunals. 
 
Hull Doctrine – ‘prompt, adequate and effective’ compensation. In 1938 the so-
called Hull Doctrine came into existence, when the property of the citizens of the United 
States of America was expropriated in Mexico.
261
 The doctrine was named after the 
United States Secretary of State Cordel Hull, who, in his famous letter to the Mexican 
Government, demanded prompt, adequate and effective compensation for the agrarian 
properties owned by United States citizens, and expropriated by the Mexican 
Government.
262
 With this doctrine, new terms evolved in international law in the field of 
compensation, as this doctrine claimed prompt, adequate and effective compensation. We 
can define these terms based on the literature dealing with the Hull doctrine. Prompt 
means that the owner of the expropriated property has to be compensated reasonably 
soon after the taking, without undue delay.
263
 However, in practice, it is rarely the case. A 
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payment of compensation in installments, even if it takes years, is an accepted practice,
264
 
provided a considerable sum of money is paid immediately following the 
expropriation.
265
 One of the problems related to prompt compensation is the lack of 
international enforcement mechanisms against states which are unwilling to pay the 
required compensation, even if it was awarded by an international tribunal. Adequate
266
 
means that the compensation is based on a fair valuation, which is basically the fair 
market value of the property.
267
 This criterion can be equated with full compensation, 
which means that the compensation should correspond to the full value of the 
expropriated rights.
268
 And finally, the criterion of effectiveness means that the 
compensation should be in a realizable form,
269
 that is to say, it should be transferable in 
convertible currency or other form (e.g., gold).
270
 As a matter of fact, the standard laid 
down by the Hull doctrine is the refined version of the just and fair (or full) compensation 
standard theories, in our opinion. All three above-mentioned components of the Hull 
doctrine are present under the just compensation standard (laid down in the Norwegian 
Shipowners’ Claims case) and the fair compensation standard (established in the 
Chorzow Factory case). It is common to all these theories that compensation should be 
paid reasonably soon in a realizable form, for the full value (including lost profits), based 
on fair market value. 
 
The standard of the Hull Doctrine can be found today in the North American Free 
Trade Agreement and in bilateral investment treaties concluded by the United States.
271
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In bilateral investment treaties, investors enjoy protection even exceeding the 





 Nevertheless, this doctrine was regarded as 
international only by the United States.
274
 However, even the US abandoned it officially 
following the Second World War, when it began to propagate the just compensation 
doctrine. At the same time, the United States, as we are going to see in the part of this 
book dealing with the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
§ 712, still interprets just compensation as prompt, adequate and effective.
275
 
Furthermore, Brownlie also argues that it is a common opinion in the West that 
expropriation is lawful if prompt, adequate, and effective compensation is provided for 
the property.
276
 Contrarily to this, authors from developing countries argue that this 
doctrine is supported by the United States and other developed countries in order to put 
developing countries into a disadvantageous position.
277
 Here we would agree with the 
German author, Professor Dolzer, who claims that this doctrine was applied, even before 
the de-colonization occurred, “in rational manner among and against” developed, western 
countries.
278
 The above-examined Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims case and the Chorzow 
Factory cases are good examples to support this assertion. At the same time, Dolzer 
admits that this rule is not always observed in practice (for example, sometimes there is 
no prompt payment in case of expropriation). 
 
Calvo Doctrine. Concerning the issue of compensation, the majority of capital 
importing countries
279
 refuse the Hull Doctrine, and refer to the Calvo Doctrine 
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 The Calvo Doctrine was named after Carlos Calvo, an Argentine diplomat and 
historian. He expressed this principle in his work “International Law in Theory and 
Practice”. According to this doctrine, in case of taking of foreign property, every state has 
to have the right to decide on its own future and economic development, that is to say, no 
state may be forced to pay adequate, effective and prompt compensation.
281
 The doctrine 
also says that foreign investors may not be better treated than the citizens of the 
expropriating state.
282
 The Calvo Doctrine also prohibits the use of diplomatic 
intervention as a method of enforcing private claims before local remedies have been 
exhausted. Hereinafter, we are going to see that this principle is reflected in many United 
Nations documents of the sixties and seventies. 
 
In practice, the Calvo Doctrine is represented by the Calvo Clause. Such clauses 
may be part of investment contracts concluded by the host state and the foreign investor, 
and in them, the investor agrees in advance to submit all disputes to the local law and 
waives all kind of diplomatic protection. In practice, it means that, regardless of the 
outcome of the exhaustion of local remedies by the foreign investor, the investor will find 
himself in the same position as any other national of the host state.
283
 All disputes 
between the host state and the foreign investor are exclusively reserved for the courts of 
the host state, ruling out any kind of international arbitration or adjudication. In our 
opinion, such clause can be detrimental for foreign investors and this must be the reason 
why the Calvo Clause is not widespread.
284
 Regarding this issue, it is interesting to 
mention that the majority of bilateral investment treaties exclude the requirement of 
exhaustion of local remedies. Paul Peter in the nineties analyzed 409 BITs, and found that 
only five of them required exhaustion of local remedies.
285
 Clauses that require the 
exhaustion of local remedies might deter foreign investors, as many times foreign 
investors are not familiar with the local legal system or are mistrustful about local 
judiciary and other authorities. Furthermore, the investment recipient state might have 
influence on these institutions. Therefore, a foreign investor might prefer international 
arbitration or other international dispute settlement mechanism when having disputes 
about compensation for taken property. 
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United Nations documents – ‘appropriate’ compensation. According to certain 
authors, the most recognized standard in international law is the appropriate 
compensation standard.
286
 This view is supported by the fact that the huge majority of 
states accepted this standard in many international multilateral and bilateral documents. 
The most important international document in which this standard first appeared was the 
General Assembly Resolution
287
 1803 (on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 





of the opinion that in the full context of adoption of the General Assembly Resolution 
1803, the expression appropriate compensation can only mean prompt, adequate and 
effective compensation.
290
 They further argue that there is no doubt that this is a 
mandatory obligation under international law. Therefore, prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation has to be paid.
291
 On the other hand, there are experts who do not accept 
this view, and argue that appropriate compensation is in no case equal to prompt, 
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adequate and effective compensation.
292
 Based on our research, we are of the opinion that 
there is still little case law to support either the former or the latter view with certainty. 
However, we would say that the standard of prompt, adequate and effective compensation 
is stricter standard and offers better protection, regarding the compensation of investors. 
 
In the following, we will have a brief look at two other important United Nations 
documents in which the standard of appropriate compensation can be found. One of them 
is the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order.
293
 This 
is a resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations. This Resolution was 
initiated by a group of less developed countries following the oil crisis of 1973,
294
 and 
was the result of a so-called pseudo-consensus, that is to say, the text of the Resolution 
was adopted without voting.
295
 The president of the General Assembly simply stated that 
“it is the desire of the meeting to adopt the text”, and the Resolution was adopted.
296
 The 
significance of this Resolution is in the fact that it considers unacceptable any form of 
sanction on a state that has expropriated property of foreign investors.
297
 In theory, this 
provision is very important as it prevents investor states from protecting their investors 
through sanctions in case of expropriation of their property. 
 
The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (December 12, 1974)
298
 is 
the other resolution of the United Nations General Assembly. This Resolution was 
adopted by the General Assembly with an overwhelming majority of the world’s 
countries. Only Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the 
United Kingdom and the United States voted against the Resolution.
299
 The Resolution 
was drafted with the support of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development.
300
 Developing countries wished to achieve several goals with this 
document: the freedom to dispose of natural resources, the right to adopt the economic 
system of their own will, subjection of foreign capital to domestic laws, and other 
goals.
301
 Brower argues that developing countries tried to use the United Nations for their 
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economic campaign at this time.
302
 Provision concerning the compensation in case of 
expropriation is contained in article 2 (2) (c) of the Resolution, which states that in case 
of taking: 
 
appropriate compensation should be paid by the state adopting such measures, taking 
into account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances that the state 
considers pertinent.
 303
 [emphasis added] 
 
As we can see, the text uses the word should that lessens the obligatory character 
of this provision.
304
 It is more interesting, that this appropriate compensation is 
determined on the grounds of domestic legislation
305
, and there is no mentioning of 
international legal standards. However, the last part of article 2 (2) (c) which states that 
the expropriating state has the absolute right to decide which factors will be taken into 
consideration when determining compensation, makes it less objective.
306
 This rejection 
of international law and legal standards is strengthened even more by the next sentence of 
the same paragraph: 
 
In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall be 
settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing state and by its tribunals, unless it is 
freely and mutually agreed by all States concerned that other peaceful means be sought 
on the basis of the sovereign equality of States and in accordance with the principle of 




In the first part of this provision we can find the above-mentioned Calvo Clause. 
However, the second part of the same provision gives the opportunity to parties to 
mutually agree on other means of conflict resolution (e.g., international arbitration). The 
original intention of the working group that worked out the proposal of the Resolution 
was to make a draft that will be binding on states and be part of the “corpus of the 
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 However, some western authors question if it had any effect at all 
on international law.
309
 The largest investor in the world, the United States, argued that 
such a document discourages rather than encourages foreign investors who are so much 
desirable by investment recipient countries.
310
 The reason for such critic might be that the 
United States, being a large investor, wants to protect the interests of its own investors, 
and this document obviously does not serve this end because it is strongly influenced by 
the Calvo Doctrine. Brower argues that the biggest deficiency of the Resolution is in the 
lack of binding character - despite the original intent of the sponsors of the Resolution.
311
 
Brower also criticizes the Resolution for not stating clearly that “economic rights and 
duties of states are subject to international law”.
312
 However, we agree with Brower that 
this Resolution still places moral obligations on the members of the world community as 
it was passed by the General Assembly of the United Nations, an organization which 
represents the will of nations of the world.
313
 Andrew T. Guzman touches the spot when 
he says that the relevance of the resolutions of the United Nations is not establishing new 
standards for expropriation in customary international law, but rather proclaiming that the 
countries voting for these resolutions do not consider the Hull doctrine part of customary 
international law.
314
 Notwithstanding, it should be mentioned that these countries still 
sign bilateral investment protection treaties that require prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation. In spite of this, the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties has had certain 
effects on international law, as this standard was also applied in major expropriation 




Issue of compensation under the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of 
the United States of America § 712. The United States of America is the largest foreign 
direct investor in the world. Thus, we should examine briefly its policy regarding the 
issue of compensation in the case of taking foreign investment. Under the Restatement, 
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there is an obvious requirement of compensation in case of taking foreign property.
316
 
Regarding the standards of compensation, the Restatement accepts the standard of 
appropriate compensation. However, it supplements it with the requirement of just 
compensation.
317
 Thus, it requires just compensation in the case of taking. The 
Restatement defines what should be understood under just compensation: 
 
[…] be in an amount equivalent to the value of the property taken and be paid at the time 
of taking, or within a reasonable time thereafter with interest from the date of taking, and 




This definition anticipates the determination of the value of the taken property, for 
what guidance is given in the Comment of the Restatement and the Reporters’ Notes, 
which states that the full value of the property must be paid.
319
 If possible, this should be 
determined based on the fair market value of the property. When determining this fair 
market value, the going concern value of the enterprise should be taken into account 
primarily, but the Comment does not exclude other valuation methods.
320
 As to the time 
of payment, the Restatement states that compensation should be paid at the time of the 
taking.
321
 It further provides that if the compensation is not paid at this moment, interest 
should be paid from the time of the taking.
322
 However, it is required that compensation 
is made, in any case, within a reasonable time
323
, that is to say, within at least a six 
months period.
324
 Defining the requirement of reasonable time helps avoiding disputes 
among the parties. The Restatement also tells us about the form of payment. The payment 
should be made in economically usable form for the foreign investor.
325
 The Comment of 
the Restatement specifies it as “convertible currency without restriction on 
repatriation”.
326
 Payment in bonds is also allowed under certain circumstances. The 
requirement is that such bonds bear interest at an economically reasonable rate and have 




Current trends in the field of international law related to our topic can be best 
examined through current case law and related academic literature. Thus, we are going to 
scrutinize above all, the case law of the Iran – United States Claims Tribunal and the 
decisions of other international arbitral bodies (like that of the ICSID or NAFTA 
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arbitration) and related analytical works. We will try to find out what is the most accepted 
compensation standard in international law nowadays. 
 
The case law of the Iran – United States Claims Tribunal. The work of the Iran – 
United States Claims Tribunal represents one of the most important body of international 
case law on the issue of compensation for expropriated foreign property.
328
 We give as 
detailed analysis as possible on the work of the Tribunal in this field.
329
 However, first let 
us see in brief the background and the history of the establishment of the Tribunal. In 
1979, following the Iranian revolution and the ‘hostage crisis’, the Government of the 
United States froze Iranian assets worth over USD 12 billion.
330
 With the mediation of 
Algeria, the parties (the United States and Iran) agreed to adhere to two accords made by 
the Algerian Government (General Declaration
331





 These documents established a tribunal that aimed to settle disputes 
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 This Tribunal applied at least five different sources of 
international law: (1) the Claims Settlement Declaration (and other agreements related to 
the Algiers Accords),
335
 (2) the Treaty of Amity (Treaty) between Iran and the United 
States,
336




 (4) customary 
international law
339




 Regarding the applicable law, 
in the opinion of Mouri, the Tribunal was hesitant to establish it, except in a few cases.
342
 
Bergmann, a German scholar, opines that the basis of the decisions of the Tribunal was 
not the international law, but primarily the Treaty of Amity between the United States 
and Iran.
343
 Moreover, Mouri argues that the Tribunal was generally of the opinion that, 
regarding the standard of compensation, in the early stages of the Tribunal’s work, the 
international law was applied. However, later there were many awards which found that 
the Treaty of Amity is the applicable lex specialis.
344
 In some cases, the Tribunal even 
took the standpoint, that the United Nations General Assembly Resolutions are not 
directly binding upon states, thus, generally are not evidence of customary law.
345
 
Furthermore, they set “ambiguous” standards concerning the amount of compensation.
346
 
The Tribunal also rejected, as guidance for customary international law, the settlement 
practices of states and investors (or other states) in the case of investment disputes.
347
 The 
reason for this might be that such settlements are usually the result of bargaining and are 
not based on legal norms and procedures. The Tribunal mostly relied on legal writing and 
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judicial and arbitral precedents.
348
 On the other hand, Matti Pellonpaa and Fitzmaurice 
argue that the Treaty of Amity was regarded as the lex specialis to be followed by the 
Tribunal. The Tribunal maybe wanted to avoid the uncertainty of international law and to 
have a firm legal framework for its decisions, an international instrument that is accepted 
by all the parties involved in the dispute. At the same time, we might presume that the 
Tribunal did not want to deprive its decisions of international recognition, and therefore it 
obviously found that its decisions are in line with international law and standards. For 
example, concerning expropriation issues, the Tribunal did not conceive Treaty standards 




The Tribunal was not unanimous concerning the issue of the standard of 
compensation.
350
 Accordingly, concerning the issue of the standard of compensation, 
awards were either based on international law or on the Treaty of Amity. The former, 
delivered on the basis of international law, can be further categorized: awards that applied 
the standard of appropriate compensation
351







For example, in the Sola Tiles award
354
, the Tribunal applied the appropriate 
compensation standard. In 1982 Sola Tiles, Inc., owner of Simat Ltd. (incorporated in 
Iran in 1975), filed a claim against the Government of Iran for damages and it asked for 
compensation of USD 3.2 million (including lost profits and goodwill) that arose from 
the expropriation of the assets of Simat Ltd.
355
 Simat Ltd. was importing and reselling 
ceramic tiles.
356
 The Israeli owner of Simat Ltd. established and registered Sola Tiles, 
Inc. in California in May 1979 with two American citizens.
357
 On May 25, 1979 all the 
assets of Simat Ltd. were transferred to Sola Tiles, Inc.
358
 The claimant alleged that from 
June 1979 “various steps were taken by the local Provisional Revolutionary Committee 
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[of Iran] to interfere with the business of Simat”. According to the claimant, the 
interference eventually amounted to taking of control and expropriation of the company's 
assets.
359
 Iran denied the expropriation and at the same time disputed the valuation 
submitted by the claimant.
360
 The Tribunal accepted the argument of the claimant that its 
assets were expropriated. Regarding the issue of valuation, the Tribunal was of the 
opinion that the compensation should be based on the fair market value of the 
company.
361
 Regarding the valuation method, the Tribunal opined that valuation should 
not be based only on the going concern value, but other circumstances should also be 
taken into account. The reason for this was an evidentiary problem, namely, the claimant 
had difficulties to access the complete documentation related to its property. First, the 
Tribunal took into consideration the estimation of physical assets and accounts receivable 
of Simat by business partners who wanted to acquire part of the company shortly before 
the revolution.
362
 Actually, the opinion of these business partners was the starting point 
for the Tribunal’s own assessment.
363
 The Tribunal gave estimate of physical assets, 
accounts receivable and the expropriated cash.
364
 The claimant claimed compensation 
also for the goodwill and lost future profits of the company.
365
 However, the Tribunal, 
when deciding this issue, took into consideration the changed (deteriorated) business 
environment in Iran - that affected also newly established businesses - and decided not to 
award lost future profits or goodwill.
366
 The Tribunal called the compensation awarded “a 
global assessment of the compensation due, representing the value of Simat's 
business“.
367
 The Tribunal also awarded interest. Although, there are many decisions of 
the Iran – United States Claims Tribunal in which the Tribunal awarded interest, this 
award is important because it explicitly tells us what standards and methods were used 
for the calculation of the awarded interest. The interest was calculated at a rate: 
 
based approximately on the amount that it would have been able to earn had it had the 
funds available to invest in a form of commercial investment in common use in its own 
state. Six-month certificates of deposit in the United States are such a form of investment 





According to the award, the respondent had to pay to the claimant USD 625,000 
plus simple interest at the rate of 10.75 percent per annum from January 1, 1980 up to 
and including the date on which the escrow agent instructed the depositary bank to effect 
payment out of the security account, plus costs of USD 20,000.
369
 In this case, the 
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Tribunal stated that appropriate compensation standard has a widespread use, noting, at 




A good example of an award requiring full compensation is the American 
International Group, Inc.
371
 case. In 1979 all insurance companies operating in Iran were 
nationalized by a special law on nationalization of insurance companies. One of these 
was the Iran America Insurance Corporation which was organized under the laws of Iran 
in 1974. American International Life Insurance Company, a company incorporated in 
Delaware, and three other companies, wholly owned subsidiaries of American 
International Group, Inc., had 35 percent of shares in Iran America. American 
International Group, Inc. claimed compensation for the taken investment (USD 39 
million). Regarding the issue of valuation, the Tribunal was of the opinion that it should 
be based on the fair market value of the business interest in the company of the claimant 
on the date of the nationalization. However, the problem that the Tribunal faced when it 
wanted to determine the fair market value was that there was no active market for the 
shares of Iran America. The Tribunal concluded that, in such case, the best solution is to 
value the company as a going concern, taking into consideration all the relevant factors, 
like the opinion of independent appraisers, prior changes in the “general political, social 
and economic conditions” that might have affect on the business prospects of the 
company. It took into consideration not only the net book value of the company, but also 
the goodwill and future prospects and profits (had the company been allowed to continue 
its business under its former management). Based on all these factors, the Tribunal made 
an approximation of the value of the company.372 The Tribunal awarded USD 7.1 million 
plus ‘simple interest’ at the annual rate of 8.5 percent from the date of the expropriation 
up to and including the date on which the escrow agent instructed the depositary bank to 
effect payment of the award.
373
 In an interlocutory award, the Tribunal concluded that, 
before the Second World War, customary international law required full compensation, 
that is to say, “compensation equivalent to the full value of the property taken”. However, 
the Tribunal, at the same time, admitted that, since then, this standard has been 




 The first award to support the premise that standard of compensation, as 





 Following the Iranian revolution Iran took (with the law on 
nationalization of insurance companies) the stake of INA Corporation in Sharg insurance 
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company registered in Iran. INA claimed USD 285,000 representing what it alleged to be 
the “going concern value of its shares”, together with interest at 17 percent. The Tribunal 
stated that the claimant is entitled to the fair market value of its shares in Sharg.
377
 The 
Tribunal found that the price INA paid in an arm’s length transaction for the shares one 
year before the nationalization represented the fair market value of the shares of Sharg as 
a going concern. The claimant, because of the relatively small amount of the claim, did 
not claim compensation for future profits (the valuation by experts would have been too 
costly having in mind the small amount of the claimed compensation), and the Tribunal 
accepted this. The Tribunal obliged Iran to pay USD 285,000 together with simple 
interest thereon at 8.5 percent per annum from the date of the expropriation up to and 
including the date of the award.
378
 This case also shows that the Tribunal accepted, as one 
of valuation methods, the going concern valuation method. 
 
The Treaty of Amity itself contains the standard of just compensation, which is 
defined by the Treaty as “full equivalent of the property taken”. The Tribunal applied a 
wide property concept, meaning that, when determining the value of the property, the 
Tribunal took into consideration also the goodwill and the future profitability (or 




 Hence, the Tribunal applied in many 
instances the standard of just compensation, interpreting it as full equivalent of the 
property taken.
381







In the former case, the claimant, Payne (American citizen) had ownership interest 
in Irantronics and Berkeh companies. These companies were dealing with electronic 
equipment and they were incorporated in Iran.
384
 In 1980 the management of the 
company was taken over by a manager appointed by the Minister of Commerce of 
Iran.
385
 The claimant claimed compensation of USD 7.2 million for his ownership 
interests in Irantronics and Berkeh, plus interest and costs.
386
 The Tribunal applied the 
standard of just compensation, meaning compensation for the full equivalent of the taken 
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property, based on its fair market value.
387
 The Tribunal established that, at the time of 
the taking, the two companies were going concerns. Thus, it valued their shares on the 
fair market value basis. However, it took into consideration the effects of the revolution 
prior to the taking of the companies on the value of their shares, debts and tax 
liabilities.
388
 The Tribunal awarded USD 900,000 plus simple interest at the rate of 11.25 
percent per annum, calculated from the date of expropriation up to and including the date 





In the latter case, the claimant, Phelps Dodge Corporation, a company from New 
York, became one of the founders of an Iranian company, SICAB. SICAB was 
established to manufacture wire and cable products in Iran.
390
 Following the revolution, 
SICAB was expropriated, and Phelps Dodge claimed damages (USD 7.5 million) plus 
interest and costs.
391
 When determining the compensation, the Tribunal has accepted the 
standard of just compensation which should be counted on the basis of full equivalent of 
the taken property.
392
 However, based on the factual evidence presented to the Tribunal 
by the parties (SICAB without the support of the service companies like Phelps Dodge 
would have had no business prospects), the Tribunal refused to value the company as 
going concern (that is to say, it refused to value goodwill and future profits). It decided 
that the claimant, Phelps Dodge, is entitled to compensation that equals its investment 
and not more.
393
 The Tribunal awarded USD 2,437,860 and “simple interest” at the rate 
of 11.25 percent per annum to the claimant, from the date of expropriation up to and 
including the date on which the escrow agent instructed the depositary bank to effect 




 In both of the previous cases, the Tribunal scrutinized profoundly all the facts of 
the cases to determine the just compensation, that is to say, the full equivalent of the 
taken property based on its fair market value. In our opinion, it follows that there cannot 
be a uniform formula for determining just compensation. Such compensation is 
determined by taking into account all the circumstances of single cases. 
 
 Examining the latest award of the Tribunal in the Frederica Lincoln Riahi v. the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran case, we can say that, in this award, the 
Tribunal invoked all the above mentioned milestone cases before reaching the final 
award.
395
 In this case Frederica Lincoln Riahi filed a claim in 1982 against the 
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Government of Iran in which she sought compensation for equity interests in a number of 
companies expropriated in 1980 by Iran.
396
 Concerning the time when the claim is 
considered to have arisen, the Tribunal held that in its previous decisions it had been 
established that an expropriation claim is considered to arise on the date of the taking.
397
 
The claimant based some of its claims on de facto taking by the Government, that is to 
say, on creeping expropriation of Riahi’s property.
398
 Therefore the Tribunal has also 
argued that: 
 
In situations where the alleged expropriation is carried out through a series of measures 
interfering with the enjoyment of the claimant's property rights, the cause of action is 
deemed to have arisen on the date when the interference, attributable to the state, ripens 
into an irreversible deprivation of those rights, rather than on the date when those 
measures began. The point of time at which interference ripens into a taking depends on 




Regarding the standard of compensation, in the Frederica Lincoln Riahi case, the 
Tribunal referred to previous decisions in which it had stated that, according to the Treaty 
of Amity and customary international law, taking requires compensation equal to the full 
equivalent of the value of the interests in the property taken.
400
 Concerning valuation 
standard, in this case, the Tribunal invoked previous decisions, such as establishing that 
the valuation of the expropriated property should be made on the basis of the fair market 
value. This was defined in the INA case as: 
 
[T]he amount which a willing buyer would have paid a willing seller for the shares of a 
going concern, disregarding any diminution of value due to the nationalisation itself or 
the anticipation thereof, and excluding consideration of events thereafter that might have 




The Tribunal stated, on the other hand, that “prior changes in the general political, 
social and economic conditions which might have affected the enterprise's business 
prospects as of the date the enterprise was taken should be considered”.
402
 Here, the 
Tribunal considered the effects of the Islamic Revolution, and acknowledged the possible 
influence of the turbulence on the economy, that is to say, on share prices of the 
company.
403
 Since the shares were not traded freely on an active and free market, the 
Tribunal used different methods to determine the price that a reasonable buyer would be 
willing to pay for the company's shares in a free-market transaction.
404
 In the opinion of 
the Tribunal, the company was a profitable, ongoing business at the time of the 
expropriation, and therefore it decided to value it as a going concern.
405
 At this point, the 
Tribunal referred to the Amoco case, where it was held that “a going concern value 
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encompasses not only the physical and financial assets of the undertaking”, but, also the 
“intangible valuables which contribute to its earning power”, like: contractual rights, 
goodwill and commercial prospects.
406
 The Tribunal also noted that it is a settled rule of 





Based on our research and some of the most important cases of the Tribunal 
discussed above, we can support the opinion of scholars like Pellonpaa, Fritzmaurice and 
Bergmann who concluded, on the bases of the case law, that the general tendency in the 
decisions of the Iran Claims Tribunal is to award compensation not only for the lost 
material property, but, in many cases, also for the lost future profits.
408
 In addition, 







, as we can see from the cases examined, the 
Tribunal applied various methods. One of the most widely used methods was the 
valuation based on fair market value on the date of taking in cases when the foreign 
investors’ equity interest in an enterprise was taken.
411
 Fair market value was defined as 
“the price that a willing buyer would pay to a willing seller in circumstances in which 
each had good information, each desired to maximise his financial gain, and neither was 
under duress or threat”.
412
 Another important valuation method in the practice of the 
Tribunal’s work was the valuation as going concern.
413
 This was defined as the full value 
of the property, business or rights in question as an income-producing asset. It also 
includes lost future profits and goodwill as we could see above.
414
 However, in some 
cases, other methods were also employed, such as discounted cash flow
415
 method of 
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valuation, methods based on liquidation value
416
, net book value
417







 As to the form of payment, effectiveness of payment was insured for claimants by 
the practice of the Tribunal. The Algerian Declaration established so-called ‘security 
accounts’ from which payments can be made to successful claimants in United States 
dollars.
420
 Concerning the time of payment, the practice of the Tribunal suggests that 
prompt payment is not a condition of the legality of the taking, however, in general, it 
was of the opinion that the compensation should be paid at the time of the taking or it 




 We are of the opinion that the Tribunal tried to compensate the investors as much 
as possible for their taken property, regardless of what term was used for the standard of 
compensation.
422
 Comparing the standard of compensation in the case law of the Iran – 
United States Claims Tribunal to the standard used in other international cases examined 
in this work, it can be said that the Tribunal offers a high standard of compensation, 
protecting investors who lost their property in Iran. At the same time, it should be noted 
that, many times, the Tribunal based its valuation on approximation of the value. The 
reason for this might be a tendency in the decisions of the Tribunal, according to which it 
tries to take into consideration all the circumstances that had effect on the taking of the 
property. 
 
ICSID case law. There are many ICSID arbitration cases related to expropriation 
of foreign investments. Because of lack of space, we examine only the most important of 
these cases, where the issue of compensation was raised. One of these is the Compania 
del Desasarrollo v. the Republic of Costa Rica, where the claimant, a company 
incorporated in the Republic of Costa Rica with majority ownership of United States 
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citizens, initiated arbitration in 1995 against the Republic of Costa Rica, related to an 
expropriation dispute.
423
 The dispute was about the amount of the compensation for the 
expropriated property of the company. Costa Rica in 1978 expropriated a coastline 
property, bought by the claimant earlier for developing tourist resort, invoking 
environmental reasons. It offered as compensation for the expropriation USD 1.9 million, 
however the company did not accept it.
424
 This was followed by long proceedings in front 
of Costa Rican Courts without any success.
425
 Costa Rica was not willing to refer the 
matter to international arbitration until it was forced by the United States to do so (the 
United States threatened with non-approval of international financial aids to the 
country).
426
 Finally, the issue was brought to ICSID arbitration. The claimant estimated 
that USD 41.2 million is the fair and full (based on fair market value) compensation for 
the property,
427
 while the respondent’s estimation of current fair market value was USD 
2.9 million.
428
 The respondent also took into consideration the ’current’ environmental 
regulations (entered into force after the expropriation) that restricted the use of the 
property for commercial purposes.
429
 The claimant contested that the arbitral Tribunal 
take into account, when estimating the value of the property, any regulation that entered 
into force after the expropriation decree was issued.
430
 Thus, the central issue of the 
arbitration was to decide the amount of compensation to be paid to Compania del 
Desarrollo.
431
 The arbitral Tribunal agreed with the parties that fair market value on the 
date of expropriation of the property should be paid as compensation.
432
 Thus, the 
Tribunal was of the opinion that “full compensation for the fair market value of the 
property, i.e., what a willing buyer would pay to a willing seller” has to be paid.
433
 
However, it stated that the environmental character of the expropriation does not affect 
the compensation.
434
 Even so, the Tribunal had to establish the exact date of the 
expropriation first. Regarding this issue, the Tribunal examined different definitions of de 
facto expropriation,
435
 since it was of the opinion that a property had been expropriated 
when the effect of the measures taken by the state “has been to deprive the owner of title, 
possession or access to the benefit and economic use of his property”.
436
 Finally, the 
Tribunal concluded that, notwithstanding that the claimant remained in the possession of 
the property, the expropriation occurred on the date when the expropriating governmental 
decree was issued.
437
 Therefore, the value of the property on this date was taken into 
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 As there were only two appraisals available to the Tribunal (one from 
each party from 1978), it made an approximation based on these valuations, and came to 
the value of USD 4.1 million.
439
 This was corrected with the interest counted from the 
time of the expropriation. Moreover, the Tribunal did not want to use full compound 
interest
440
, because the claimant remained in possession. At the same time, as the 
claimant could use neither the property for development purposes, nor the amount of 
compensation for a long time, the Tribunal did not want to award simple interest either.
441
 
Consequently, the Tribunal awarded compound interest “adjusted by taking into account 
all the relevant factors”,
442




In another case, Tecmed, a company with registered seat in Spain, claimed 
compensation from the Mexican Government for expropriation.
444
 The claimant’s claim, 
that is to say, the estimated market value of the investment was USD 52 million, based on 
discounted cash flow calculation method.
445
 The respondent objected this method, 
because in its opinion the investment operated for too short period of time as going 
business, and it requested the calculation of damages based on “the investment made, 
upon which the investment’s market value would be determined”.
446
 The Tribunal also 
took into consideration the money paid for the investment at the tender, USD 4 million.
447
 
After the examination of the facts, the Tribunal also concluded that, because of the short 
period of operation of the investment and the lack of objective data, the discounted cash 
flow calculation method should be disregarded.
448
 The agreement between the parties, on 
which the arbitration was based, stated in its article 5.2. that in the case of expropriation: 
 
[C]ompensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated 
investment immediately before the time when the expropriation took place, was decided, 
announced or made known to the public […] valuation criteria shall be determined 
                                                          
438
 Id. para. 83. 
439
 Id. para. 90. 
440
 Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary defines the term as “interest computed on the sum of an original 
principal and accrued interest”. (visited on Mar. 12, 2013) <http://www.m-w.com/cgi-
bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=compound+interest>; Money Glossary defines it as: “interest rate in 
which the interest is calculated not only on the initial principal but also the accumulated interest of prior 
periods.” (visited on Mar. 12, 2013) <http://www.moneyglossary.com/?w=Compound+Interest>. 
441
 Compania del Desarrollo para. 105. 
442
 Id. para. 106. 
443
 Id. para. 107. 
444
 Award in Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States (Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/2). ICSID web page (visited on March 16, 2013) 
<http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/laudo-051903%20-English.pdf>, para. 183. 
445
 Id. under para. 185. Home Glossary defines ‘discounted cash flow’ as:  “A method to estimate the value 
of a real estate investment, which emphasizes after-tax cash flows and the return on the invested dollars 
discounted over time to reflect a discounted yield. The value of the real estate investment is the present 
worth of the future after-tax cash flows from the investment, discounted at the investor's desired rate of 
return.”. (visited on Jan. 25, 2013) < 
http://www.yourwebassistant.net/glossary/d7.htm#discounted_cash_flow >. 
446
 See id.; However, the respondent did not miss to challenge the result of the discounted cash flow method 
with the estimation of its own expert witnesses between USD 1,8 and 2,1 million. See id. 
447









Therefore, the Tribunal examined the Mexican law on expropriation that stated 
that the compensation shall indemnify for the “commercial value of the expropriated 
property, which in the case of real property shall not be less than the tax value”.
450
 The 
Tribunal interpreted this requirement as compensation based on the market value.
451
 
When determining the value of the expropriated investment, the starting point for the 
Tribunal was the price for which the investment was acquired at the tender.
452
 Besides, it 
also considered additional investments made by the claimant,
453
 and net income of the 
investment for one additional year.
454
 This latter, basically covered managerial and 
organizational skills and goodwill.
455
 Finally, the Tribunal awarded USD 5.5 million.
456
 
The award required effective and full payment.
457
 It also prescribed compound interest (at 
annual rate of 6 percent) until the payment from the date of the expropriation (this is 






 These cases confirmed that the fair market value standard is used and applied in 
practice. On the basis of these cases, we can also conclude that the principle of restitutio 
in integrum, in the case of taking foreign property, is accepted by international tribunals 
like the ICSID. In our opinion, ICSID offers an effective way to the investors to get fair 
(here we use the term subjectively) compensation based on fair market value of the 
property taken. 
 
 NAFTA case law. The North American Free Trade Agreement does not say 
explicitly that prompt, adequate and effective compensation is required when foreign 
property is taken, however, with its provisions, it covers indirectly this standard. 
According to the Agreement, “compensation shall be paid without delay and be fully 
realizable”.
460
 The Agreement also guarantees free transferability of the compensation, 
immediately on payment.
461
 It contains an explicit formula - fair market value - for 
determining compensation: 
 
Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated investment 
immediately before the expropriation took place ("date of expropriation"), and shall not 
                                                          
449




 Id. 188. 
452
 Id. para. 191; Neither the respondent nor the claimant challenged this method for determining the fair 
market value. 
453
 However, it is a procedural matter. It should be mentioned that the court recognised as additional 
investment only investments that were supported by documentary evidence. See id. para. 195. 
454








 Id. para. 39. 
459
 Id. 201. 
460
 Art. 1110 (3) of the North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA Secretariat Info page (visited on 
Apr. 5, 2013) <http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/english/index.htm>. 
461
 Id. art. 1110 (6). 
 65 
reflect any change in value occurring because the intended expropriation had become 
known earlier. Valuation criteria shall include going concern value, asset value including 





 The Agreement also makes precise provisions on the interest rates related to late 
payment, that is to say, for the period between the date of the expropriation and the 
payment date (because of the requirement of prompt payment). It provides that if the 
payment of compensation is done in G7
463
 currency, the compensation has to bear a 
commercially reasonable rate from the date of the expropriation until the date of the 
actual payment.
464
 If the payment is done in other than G7 currency, the Agreement 
provides the following, regarding the issue of the interest to be paid: 
 
[…] the amount paid on the date of payment, if converted into a G7 currency at the 
market rate of exchange prevailing on that date, shall be no less than if the amount of 
compensation owed on the date of expropriation had been converted into that G7 
currency at the market rate of exchange prevailing on that date, and interest had accrued 
at a commercially reasonable rate for that G7 currency from the date of expropriation 




For example, in the Metalclad case the Tribunal stated that on the basis of its 
provisions,
466
 NAFTA clearly supports the inclusion of interest in an award.
467
 In this 
case, the Tribunal proceeded from the assumption that the investor completely lost its 
investment.
468
 Both parties accepted to calculate the compensation on the basis of the fair 
market value standard.
469
 However, they offered different methods for the calculation of 
this value. Metalclad suggested two alternative methods for the calculation of the 
compensation. One was the discounted cash flow analysis of future profits to establish the 
fair market value.
470
 By this approach, Metalclad came up with an amount of USD 90 
million.
471
 The other one was the valuation of the actual investment made by the 
company.
472
 Under this, it reached approximately USD 20 to 25 million. Mexico objected 
to the discounted cash flow method, claiming that it was not applicable because the 
expropriated company was not a going concern.
473
 However, it offered a method of 
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 that would result between USD 13 to 15 million.
475
 At the same 
time, Mexico agreed with the second method proposed by Metalclad, however, referring 
to it as “direct investment value approach”, and reaching only between USD 3 to 4 
million.
476
 The Tribunal rejected the first method suggested by the claimant. The 
investment was never operative, and therefore the Tribunal found that the application of 
the discounted cash flow analysis would not be appropriate. In the opinion of the 
Tribunal, for the application of this method, it is needed that the company operates for a 
sufficiently long period that gives appropriate basis for determining the estimated future 
profits, subject to discounted cash flow analysis.
477
 In such case, the value of the 
goodwill of the company also has to be taken into consideration.
478
 However, in the 
opinion of the Tribunal, this was not the case with Metalclad investment.
479
 Thus, the 
Tribunal used the second method offered by the parties, that is to say, the fair market 
value method. When considering the issue of lost profits, it was of the opinion that they 
can be awarded, however the claimant had the burden of proof, that is to say, it had to 
provide a realistic estimate of lost profits.
480
 The Tribunal also emphasized that, when 
making the award, it accepted the principles of the Chorzow Factory case, that is to say, 
that the award has to reestablish the status quo ante.
481
 Regarding the issue of interest, the 
Tribunal was of the opinion that interest should be part of the compensation and it should 
be counted from the date when the state became “internationally responsible” for the 
taking.
482
 In this particular case, from the date on which Metalclad’s application for 
construction permit was “wrongly denied”.
483
 The court determined a six percent per 
annum interest rate.
484





Another interesting ICSID case is the S. D. Mayers case, in which, in contrast to 
the previous case, the Tribunal did not find that the regulation (i.e., the export ban) 
amounted to expropriation. In addition, the Tribunal refused to apply to breaches of 
article 1102 (“national treatment”) and article1105 (“minimum standard of treatment”) 
the principles laid down in article 1110 of NAFTA concerning expropriation.
486
 In the 
opinion of the Tribunal, standard of article 1110 of NAFTA, like that of fair market 
value, was “expressly attached […] to expropriations” by the drafters of NAFTA.
487
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Furthermore, it was of the opinion, that in cases that do not involve expropriation, 
drafters intentionally left it open to tribunals to determine compensation standards.
488
 In 
such cases, tribunals have to take into consideration “the specific circumstances of the 
case,” principles of international law and the provisions of NAFTA.
489
 The Tribunal did 
not exclude theoretically the applicability of the fair market value standard; however, it 
was of the opinion that it was not applicable for this very case.
490
 It stated that the 
suitable international law standard for this case could be found in the Chorzow Factory 
case.
491
 That is to say, “the compensation should undo the material harm inflicted by a 
breach of an international obligation”.
492
 In his concurrent opinion, one of the members 
of the panel, Bryan P. Schwartz brings on interesting arguments. He claims that “fair 
market value might, in some cases, be less than fair value. An investment might be worth 
more to the investor for various reasons, including synergies within its overall operations, 
than it is to third parties.” He also argues that the finding that the expropriation has 
happened, on the other hand, should not reduce the amount of compensation that is ought 
to be awarded. He further states, that the cumulative principle applies within Chapter 11 
of NAFTA. When a government denies to investors the protection assured by specific 
provisions of Chapter 11, compensation may be required above and beyond that which 
would apply in the ordinary case of a lawful expropriation. However, at the same time he 
says that:  
 
[…] even if we had found that the export ban did amount to an expropriation under the 
terms of article 1110, that finding would not necessarily have provided a basis for 
awarding any compensation above and beyond that already recoverable under the terms 




In connection with this case, we have noticed that the Tribunal placed great 
emphasis on factual proof of the claims when determining the amount of compensation 




 The NAFTA case law also supports the assumption that the valuation standard of 
fair market value is the most accepted in international law, and also that the principle of 
in integrum restitutio forms the basis of awards in expropriation cases where the main 
issue is compensation. This proves the constantly rising standard of investment protection 
in the world, that might be the result of the growing importance of private property 
protection or simply the fact that international competition for investments got tighter 
with the globalization, and therefore, investment recipient countries try to offer the most 
in every field. 
 
Conclusion. Examining the development of compensation theories and 
international case law that developed in line with it, we came to the conclusion that there 
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is neither uniform theory nor uniform practice in the field of compensation standards 
related to taking of foreign investment. Besides, it is not easy to establish whether the 
taking was lawful or not, that is to say, whether the conditions discussed in the previous 
chapters were fulfilled (the taking was non-discriminatory, there was an existing public 
purpose and there was appropriate compensation). On the basis of the studied cases we 
can say that, even if the first two conditions are fulfilled, but there has been no adequate 
compensation, the taking is considered many times unlawful, however, not always. It is 
also the practice of tribunals to order in integrum restitutio. There are a number of cases 
that refer to the standard of the Chorzow Factory case, in which it was stated that the 
reparation must reestablish the status quo ante. This means usually full compensation, 
based on fair market value, which is, in our opinion, the most objective valuation 
standard. In some cases, compensation is awarded for lost future profits as well, and this 
solution can be equitable, however, it is difficult to calculate fairly the lost profits. All in 
all, the examination of the case law shows that the prompt, adequate and effective 
standard prevails in practice. At the same time, we may not forget that many international 
conventions contain provisions that formally do not comply with the above-said, and that 
many countries of the world formally do not accept it. 
  
Thus, the majority of disputes is about the standard of compensation in the case of 
taking of foreign property. Therefore, it would be helpful to work out a more detailed and 
precise system of compensation on international level. We are convinced that making 







In the first chapter of this book the most important terms related to taking of 
foreign property were scrutinized. It was observed that notions like taking, expropriation 
and nationalization are often used indiscriminately to designate the same concept. In the 
case of expropriation and nationalization, private property is taken by the state on 
permanent basis. We noted that one of the differences between these two terms is that in 
the case of nationalization compensation is many times not assumed. However, there is 
no evidence that it is true in general. In the case of expropriation the expropriating state 
usually provides some compensation. Other important differences are that nationalization 
is usually related to some socio-economic changes in the given society and there is a 
specific underlying legislation, while in the case of expropriation general legislation 
constitutes the basis of the taking. Following this, the meaning of intervention was 
examined. It was concluded that intervention is an action of the government, whereby it 
assumes control of a business (or any other foreign private property) with the intention of 
operating it for a limited period of time, achieving a particular goal. It is important that 
the property gets back to the original owner after a reasonable period of time. The owner 
of such property is entitled to compensation for the time he was not able to use his 
property. Confiscation was defined as taking of foreign property with no compensation. 
We also concluded that distinction can be made between de jure and de facto taking. The 
host state might take measures that in fact (de facto) dispose the owner of his property, 
but legally do not affect the ownership – this is called creeping, indirect or de facto 
taking. We found that, in practice, the biggest problem is drawing the line between taking 
and creeping expropriation. Creeping expropriation basically has the same effect on the 
owner of the property as taking would have: it disables the owner to exercise all his rights 
related to his property. Generally, at the end of the chapter, it was established that capital 
exporting states try to define the term taking (expropriation, nationalization) as general 
as possible, while capital importing states try to give as narrow interpretation to the term 
as possible. 
 
The next two chapters dealt with two requirements of lawful taking of property: 
the existence of public interest (or purpose) and the requirement of non-discrimination 
when taking foreign property. It was concluded that sovereign states have the right to 
take foreign property if it is taken for public purpose, in a non-discriminatory manner, 
accompanied by appropriate compensation.
495
 This is supported by international 
documents, as well as by international court and arbitral decisions. We established that 
these requirements rarely constitute basis for dispute. Thus, as we have seen supra, there 
are still few cases related to these issues in international case law. These cases supported 
our premise that these principles are requirements for lawful taking of foreign property. 
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In the fourth chapter we scrutinized the most challenging issue, the requirement of 
compensation in the case of taking foreign property. The standard of compensation and 
the form and time of payment of compensation were examined. We found that there are 
many disputes regarding the standard of compensation, and that the present situation in 
international law, regarding this issue, is not really clarified. It can be said that there are 
many different standards and opinions concerning this question. To get a clearer picture 
on the issue, the development of compensation theories was presented through the most 
important milestone cases. First, the Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims case and the just 
compensation standard were scrutinized. Following this, we looked at the Chorzow 
Factory case and the standard of fair or full compensation. Based on these cases, it was 
concluded that the just compensation standard does not differ much from the fair or full 
compensation standard. In both cases, compensation was based on fair market value of 
the taken property and both required basically in integrum restitutio (if not possible, 
monetary compensation) including lost profits. The next step was to examine the Hull 
doctrine. During our research we came to the conclusion that the majority of capital 
exporting countries in fact support the requirements laid down in the Hull doctrine 
(expropriation should be prompt, adequate and effective), even if they usually use the 
expression of just compensation, or even accept appropriate compensation, interpreting it 
as prompt, adequate and effective, as the United States of America does. This 
interpretation is also supported by international case law. All in all, we found that capital 
importing states in general support the standard of appropriate compensation, however 
with different content. Related to this issue the so-called Calvo Doctrine was examined, 
which declares that the host country has the right to decide on the time, amount, and form 
of compensation, if there is no agreement to the contrary. When examining related 
international jurisprudence, we found that it is very colorful concerning this issue: there 
are mostly western authors who are of the opinion that the Hull Doctrine is too strict, and 
also, on other hand, there are some who claim that the Calvo Doctrine should be 
understood in a more flexible way. Some authors try to solve the problem with the 
principle of unjust enrichment (“what has the taker gained”), some would differentiate 
between industrialized and not-industrialized states (the latter should pay lower 
compensation in the case of takings), and there are some authors who would take into 
consideration how much did the foreign investor contributed to the development of the 
host state in the past. The debate during the last fifty years was mostly on the question 
what terminology should be used: just, fair, prompt, adequate, effective, appropriate or 
full. Concerning this, we fully agree with Professor Schachter who noticed very correctly 
that: “It is the definition of appropriate that matters, not the term itself, which might well 
be replaced by fair, just or a similar expression.”.
496
 We have also established that, in 
practice, developing countries, even if they hold on to classical principles of sovereignty 
over resources, accept the Hull Doctrine in bilateral investment treaties. In our opinion 
the reason for this is very simple: developing countries understand that they need foreign 
capital for economic development and if they are not fair when expropriating foreign 
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Following this historical development overview, we examined current trends in 
international jurisprudence regarding the issue of compensation in the case of taking 
foreign property. First, the case law of the Iran – United States Claims Tribunal was 
scrutinized. The most important finding was that the Tribunal placed the emphasis on the 
issue of fair market value of the taken property and not on the compensation standard. 
Thus, the Tribunal mentioned in several awards compensation standards like just and full, 
using the fair market value of the taken property at the same time. Besides the practice of 
the Iran – United States Claims Tribunal, some multilateral instruments and the related 
case law were investigated. Thus, we came to the conclusion that, regarding these 
multilateral instruments, the standard of compensation is prompt, adequate and effective. 
 
All in all, in our opinion, investors require high standards of protection, meaning 
that, in the case of taking of their property, they wish to have full compensation based on 
the fair market value, as it was emphasized in most cases. Besides, it is also accepted that 
such compensation has to be paid promptly and has to be effective. 
 
However, there is certain inconsistency in the practice and the position of 
developing countries. On the one hand, on international fora, these countries stand up for 
the principle that the issue of compensation and other issues related to taking, being 
under dispute, should be solely decided by the courts of the expropriating country, and 
that they should have right (limited only by local jurisdiction) to take foreign property, 
which is actually based on the Calvo Doctrine. On the other hand, they willingly sign 
bilateral investment treaties, in which these countries accept international legal standards 
as exemplified in the Hull doctrine which basically contradicts to the above said 
international claims.
498
 The reason for this contradiction might be the huge competition 
for luring in foreign capital and, at the same time, the need to correspond to domestic 
political expectations related to the protection of national interests. However, Sornarajah 
explains this phenomenon, or better to say contradiction, with the following: there is 
uncertain protection of foreign investment in international law, so the above-mentioned 
countries entered to these treaties to clarify the rules of the game for the case of 
expropriation.
499
 There is another argument that is not only supported by Sornarajah, but 
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also by Dolzer, namely that developing countries accept the full compensation principle, 
or basically the Hull doctrine, in bilateral investment treaties, because of special benefits 
they enjoy under such treaties.
500
 We would not agree with this, as under these treaties, 
the host country usually, does not enjoy many benefits. The reason must be that host 
countries are forced to accept stricter conditions; otherwise investors would not bring 
their capital. At the same time, governments are frequently exposed to domestic pressure 
that requires stronger protection of domestic interests. 
 
On the whole, it can be said that proper and adequate legal protection of foreign 
investors, especially in the case of taking of foreign investment, has positive impact on 
foreign direct investment inflows. At the same time, it has been concluded that sovereign 
states have the right to take foreign property, respecting certain principles of international 
law: the taking has to serve public purpose, has to be non-discriminatory and 
accompanied by appropriate compensation. Of course, all this should be done with the 
guarantee of due process. It is also a fact that investment protection standards are 
changing very fast in our globalizing world, and, with this process, the standard of 
foreign investment protection is constantly getting higher and higher. In a well 
functioning economy, guaranteeing full protection of foreign investment cannot be a 
burden for the state. Thus, generally it should not be a problem in case of taking to offer 
correct protection to any foreign investor who enters the country. 
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REPORTS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS 
 
Norwegian shipowners’ claims (Norway v. USA) 
13 October 1922 
(excerpts) 
 
NORWEGIAN SHIPOWNERS' CLAIMS 




AWARD OF THE TRIBUNAL. Award of the tribunal of arbitration between the United 
States of America and the Kingdom of Norway under the special agreement of June 30, 
1921. 
[…] 
It is common ground between the Parties to this arbitration that the fifteen claims againsL 
the United States are presented by the Government of the Kingdom of Norway, which 
Government, and not the individual claimants, "is the sole claimant before this Tribunal". 
L ' The claims arise out of certain actions of the United States of America in relation to 
ships which were building in the United States for Norwegian subjects at a time, during 
the recent Great War, when the demand for ships was enormous, owing to the needs of 
the armies and to the losses of mercantile ships. For some time before the United States 
declared war, the shortage of shipping was serious both in European countries and in the 
United States. In these circumstances, Norwegian subjects, amongst others, directed their 
attention to the possibilities of shipbuilding in the United States. From July 1915 
onwards, various contracts were placed by Norwegian subjects with shipyards in the 
United States. Meanwhile, from the summer of 1916 onwards, the United States 
Government took a series of steps for the protection of its interests and these steps made 
possible the later "mobilisation for war purposes of the commercial and industrial 
resources of the United States". 2 Into most of these measures it is not necessary Lo enter 
in any detail, as they do not directly affect the merits of the claims. 
The United States declared war against Germany on April 6th, 1917. Already by the 
United States Shipping Act of September 1916 the United States Shipping Board had 
been established "for the purpose of encouraging, developing and creating a naval 
auxiliary and naval reserve and a merchant marine to meet the requirements of the 
commerce of the United States with its territories and possessions and with foreign 
countries". 1 This Board was empowered by section 5 of the Act : 
to have constructed and equipped in American shipyards and Navy yards or elsewhere, 
giving preference, other things being equal, to domestic yards, or to purchase, lease, or 
charter, vessels suitable, as far as the commercial requirements of the marine trade of the 
United States may permit, for use as naval auxiliaries or Army transports, or for other 
naval or military purposes, and to make necessary repairs on and alterations of such 
vessels. Provided: That neither the board nor any corporation formed under section 
eleven in which the United States is then a stockholder shall purchase, lease, or charter 
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any vessel (a) Which is then engaged in the foreign or domestic commerce of the United 
States, unless it is about to be withdrawn from such commerce without any intention on 
the part of the owner to return it thereto within a reasonable time; (b) Which is under the 
registry or flag of a foreign country which is then engaged in war; (c) Which is not 
adapted, or can not by reasonable alterations and repairs be adapted to the purpose 
specified in this section ; (d) Which, upon expert examination made under the direction 
of the board, a written report of such examination being filed as a public record, is not 
without alteration or repair found to be at least seventy-five per centum as efficient as at 
the time it was originally put in commission as a seaworthy vessel. 
Section 7 of the Act provided: "That the board, upon terms and conditions prescribed by 
it and approved by the President, may charter, lease, or sell to any person, a citizen of the 
United States, any vessel so purchased, constructed, or transferred." Section 9 of the Act 
gave the Board certain additional powers "when the United States is at war or during any 
national emergency the existence of which is declared by proclamation of the President." 
These additional powers were: 
no vessel registered or enrolled and licensed under the laws of the United States shall, 
without approval of the board, be sold, leased, or chartered to any person not a citizen of 
the United States, or transferred to a foreign registry of flag. No vessel registered or 
enrolled and licensed under the laws of the United States, or owned by any person a 
citizen of the United States, except one which the board is prohibited from purchasing, 
shall be sold to any person not a citizen of the United States or transferred to a foreign 
registry of flag, unless such vessel is first tendered to the board at the price in good faith 
offered by others, or, if no such offer, at a fair price to be determined in the manner 
provided in section ten. 
A proclamation under this section of the Act was issued by the President on February 5th, 
1917, and thus these emergency powers of the Shipping Board came into operation. 1 
Section 11 of the United States Shipping Act of September 1916, authorized the Shipping 
Board to: "form under the laws of the District of Columbia one or more corporations for 
the purchase, construction, equipment, lease, charter, maintenance, and operation of 
merchant vessels in the commerce of the United States." 2 On the day of the declaration 
of war by the United States (April 6th, 1917) the Shipping Board exercised this authority 
and formed the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation to carry out, 
in general, the purposes set forth in section 11 of the Act. All the stock of this corporation 
was owned by the United States. Though its certificate of Incorporation of April 16th, 
1917, provided "that the existence of this corporation shall be perpetual," 3 it had been 
laid down in section 11 of the Act that "at the expiration of five years from the conclusion 
of the present European War the operation of vessels on the part of any such corporation 
in which the United States is then a stockholder shall cease and the said corporation stand 
dissolved. . . . The vessels and other property of any such corporation shall revert to the 
board." s For some time before the declaration of war the question of requisitioning ships 
by the United States had been considered and the fact that early in 1917 a large 
proportion of the shipyards in the United States was engaged with contracts for foreign 
shipowners led to various proposals and negotiations into which it is unnecessary to enter 
here. On the 4th of March 1917 (after the severance of diplomatic relations between the 
United States and Germany on February 3rd, 1917), a Naval Emergency Fund Act was 
passed. This Act authorized and empowered the President, "in addition to all other 
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existing provisions of law" within the limits of the appropriation available, "to place an 
order with any person for such ships or war material as the necessities of the 
Government, to be determined by the President, may require and which are of the nature, 
kind, and quantity usually produced or capable of being produced by such person." Such 
orders were given precedence over all other orders and compliance was made obligatory. 
In the case of noncompliance, the President was authorized to "take immediate 
possession of any factory3 or of any part thereof."5 The President was furthermore 
empowered, under the same penalty, "to modify or cancel any existing contract for the 
building, production, or purchase of ships or war material," to place an order for the 
whole or any part of the output of a factory in which ships or war material were being 
built or produced, and to "requisition and take over for use or operation by the 
Government any factory or any part thereof." ' In all cases where these powers were 
exercised, provision was made for "just compensation" to be determined by the President, 
with the customary provision for an appeal to the courts. Then on June 15th, 1917, two 
months after the declaration of War, further important powers were given to the President 
by the Emergency Shipping Fund Provision of the Urgent Deficiencies Act. The relevant 
provisions of this Act are as follows :  
The President is hereby authorized and empowered, within the limits of the amounts 
herein authorized: (a) To place an order with any person for such ships or material as the 
necessities of the Government, to be determined by the President, may require during the 
period of the War and which are of the nature, kind and quantity usually produced or 
capable of being produced by such person. (6) To modify, suspend, cancel, or requisition 
any existing or future contract for the building, or purchase of ships or material. (c) To 
require the owner or occupier of any plant in which ships or materials are built or 
produced to place at the disposal of the United States the whole or any part of the output 
of such plant, to deliver such output thereof in such quantities and at such times as may 
be specified in the order. (d) To requisition and take over for use or operation by the 
United States any plant, or any part thereof without taking possession of the entire plant, 
whether the United States has or has not any contract or agreement with the owner or 
occupier of such plant. (e) To purchase, requisition, or take over the title to, or the 
possession . of, for use or operation by the United States, any ship now constructed or in 
the process of construction or hereafter constructed or any part thereof, or charter of such 
ship. Compliance with all orders issued hereunder shall be obligatory on any person to 
whom such order is given, and such order shall take precedence over all other orders and 
contracts placed with such person. If any person owning any ship, charter, or material, or 
owning, leasing, or operating any plant equipped for the building or production of ships 
or material shall refuse or fail to comply therewith or to give to the United States such 
preference in the execution of such order, or shall refuse to build, supply, furnish, or 
manufacture the kind, quantities or qualities of the ships or material so ordered, at such 
reasonable price as shall be determined by the President, the President may take 
immediate possession of any ship, charter, material or plant of such person, or any part 
thereof without taking possession of the entire plant, and may use the same at such times 
and in such manner as he may consider necessary or expedient. Whenever the United 
States shall cancel, modify, suspend or requisition any contract, make use of, assume, 
occupy, requisition, acquire or take over any plant or part thereof, or any ship, charter or 
material in accordance with the provisions hereof, it shall make just compensation 
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therefor, to be determined by the President; and if the amount thereof so determined by 
the President, is unsatisfactory to the person entitled to receive the same, such person 
shall be paid seventy-five per centum of the amount so determined by the President and 
shall be entitled to sue the United States to recover such further sum as, added to said 
seventy-five per centum, will make up such amount as will be just compensation therefor, 
in the manner provided for by section twentyfour, paragraph twenty, and section one 
hundred and forty-five of the Judicial Code. The President may exercise the power and 
authority hereby vested in him, and expend the money herein and hereafter appropriated 
through such agency or agencies as he shall determine from time to time, Provided: That 
all money turned over to the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation 
may be expended as other moneys of said corporation are now expended. All ships 
constructed, purchased, or requisitioned under authority herein, or heretofore or hereafter 
acquired by the United States, shall be managed, operated, and disposed of as the 
President may direct. 
Up to the date of this Act, though different proposals had been mooted, no definite action 
as regards requisitioning ships or contracts for ships had been taken. Negotiations were 
opened between the Norwegian Government and the United States authorities and these 
will be discussed later. Definite action, however, began on August 3rd, 1917. 
II. 
WAS THE CLAIMANTS' PROPERTY TAKEN? 
The Fleet Corporation sent a general order of requisition by telegram to almost all the 
shipyards of the United States on August 3rd and 4th, 1917, but it did not send any 
detailed order of requisition, giving the particular ships or contracts to which the 
requisition was intended to apply. Nor did the Corporation state precisely to what extent 
each of the yards was requisitioned. The Tribunal cannot regard this notice as sufficient 
as regards foreign owners of shipbuilding contracts, except for the purpose of preventing 
any transfer to a foreign flag or to foreign ownership or any other change to the status 
quo which could have been detrimental from the point of view of national defence. This 
telegraphic order of August 3rd, sent to the shipyards Only, ordered the completion of all 
vessels "with all practicable despatch," and referred to a letter which was to follow. l The 
order contained in the letter of August 3rd expressly requisitioned not only the ships and 
the material, but also the contracts, the plans, detailed specifications and payments made, 
and it even commandeered the yards (depriving them of their right to accept any further 
contracts). In spite of this the United States have contended that there was no requisition, 
except of "physical property" and have strongly maintained that the word "contract" in 
the letter of 3rd August only referred to commitments for material.2 It is common ground 
that the United States ordered the shipyards not to accept after August 3rd, 1917, any 
further progress payments under the contracts from the private owners, but that 
subsequent progress payments were made by some of the former owners to the 
shipbuilders. J The United States have also proved that, for instance, on September 12th, 
1917, Admiral Capps, General Manager of the United States Emergency Fleet 
Corporation, wrote to the Cunard Steamship Co. New York: You are informed that all 
shipbuilders have been directed not to accept any payments from you on account of 
requisitioned ships, and that in this case, where you have actually made payment, the 
shipbuilders will be directed to return this payment to you. You are now directed not to 
make any further payments or tenders of payments to any shipbuilders having under 
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construction ships which were requisitioned by us. You are also further informed that no 
reimbursement will be made to you of payments which you have heretofore made to the 
shipbuilders, and no other form of settlement will be made with you without securing, for 
the benefit of our shipbuilders, complete releases of their contract obligations to deliver 
ships to you in place of the ships which we have requisitioned. The foregoing is not to be 
considered even an additional agreement to reimburse you at this time. The whole subject 
of compensation to former owners is now under consideration. 
To the British War Mission Admiral Capps wrote as follows, on September 13th, 1917: 
I beg to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 10th inst., in relation to the Cunard 
Line's action in making tenders of payment to the shipbuilders covering ships 
requisitioned by the Fleet Corporation. The Emergency Fleet Corporation specifically 
ordered the shipbuilders not to accept payments from former owners, and in similar cases 
has directed the owners not to make tenders of payment to the shipbuilders. This is in 
strict conformity with the authority vested in the Fleet Corporation and the Cunard 
Company has again been directed not to make any such tenders. In this connection it is of 
course assumed that it is not the intention of the Cunard Co., in making these tenders to 
place our shipbuilders in a position where they will have to deliver ships to the Cunard 
Line after the emergency has passed. The Fleet Corporation will necessarily take all 
suitable steps to protect the shipbuilders, and to prevent them from being placed in such 
an embarrassing position. 
It is common ground that one of the progress payments was made, with the assent of the 
United States Fleet Corporation, by one of the Norwegian claimants to the Seattle 
Construction and Dry Dock Co., after August 3rd, 1917, to the amount of 70,000 Dollars, 
on hull No. 92 (Steamship "Sacramento" Claim No. 4) ; that this sum was due on August 
2 ; that the claimants or their assignors, the former owners, had fulfilled their contracts up 
to the time of the requisition; that on December 3rd, 1919, the United States Requisition 
Claims Committee, in their award, authorized payment of these progress payments to the 
Norwegian claimants; that these sums have not yet been paid to the claimants, although 
the United States were asked repeatedly to do so; and that the formal claims were 
presented in 1919 on behalf of the present claimants.2 Counsel for the United States were 
invited by the Tribunal to prove that these payments were not credited by Ihe 
Shipbuilders to the United States Emergency Fleet Corporation in their reciprocal 
accounts and payments But no evidence was adduced to prove this; nor can it be denied 
that the United States Fleet Corporation debited these sums to the shipbuilders, as if they 
had been paid by the Corporation under the contracts3. There is an example of this in the 
letter to the Seattle Construction and Dry Dock Co., of May 10th, 1918. 4 Although the 
Corporation wrote to the shipowners at the beginning of September 1917, that the subject 
of compensation to former owners "was under consideration," the correspondence of the 
General Managers of the Fleet Corporation (as it has been submitted to the Tribunal) 
shows conclusively that there was at the beginning an intention—confirmed by the orders 
to the shipyards—of including these payments in the compensation to be paid, not by the 
shipbuilders, but by the Fleet Corporation, to the former shipowners, with interest from 
August 3rd, 1917. Thus the Board asked for "any information necessary to a fair and just 
determination of the obligations of the Emergency Fleet Corporation in taking' over these 
ships and contracts." 1 In their correspondence of about August 20th, 1917 with the 
former owners of the contracts, the General Managers of the United States Emergency 
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Fleet Corporation, after having expressly mentioned that they were writing to them as 
owners, or as the representatives of the owners, of the contracts with the shipyards, 
expressly stated their intention of reimbursing them, promptly, so far as funds are 
available for the payments heretofore made to the shipbuilders, if, after the investigation 
of data submitted by the owner, such payments are found in order and in conformity with 
the contract requirements. At your further and early convenience you are requested to 
submit to the Corporation, a statement of such indirect expenditures as you have made on 
account of each vessel ; for instance the cost of superintendence, original design, interest 
on funds already paid, and the like. The matters mentioned will require careful audit, and 
in addition you may submit any other matters you deem pertinent. It will be perceived 
that the Corporation presumes it is addressing this letter to the owners or responsible 
representatives of the owners or persons entitled to receive compensation on account of 
the requisition of the vessels listed above. The Corporation requests that there be included 
in your response to this letter all evidence of ownership, which is necessary to establish 
the right of those who are entitled to receive the compensation provided by law. The 
consummation of the orders herein and heretofore transmitted will be made the subject of 
later appropriate corporate action. The General Managers of the Fleet Corporation gave 
the following instructions to their district officers:2 You will please forward without 
delay the usual certificates for payments which have become due under the contract after 
that date, so far as practicable, certified by the former local inspector as well as yourself. 
These payments to the shipbuilder for the present must not exceed the actual cost of the 
contractor's outlay for labour, materials received since the last payment, plus the 
approved overhead expense, nor must the payment so determined exceed the contract 
payment accrued. It is the expectation of the Corporation to carry out the substance and 
purpose of the contract but this decision cannot be made definite until the Corporation 
can investigate the facts and terminology of each contract to assure proper protection of 
the Government. You will please furnish to the shipbuilder a copy of this letter and one 
copy of the enclosure, and you will request the shipbuilder to furnish you without delay, 
for transmission to the Corporation, a statement in detail of such payments received on 
account of each contract prior to August 3rd. the date of requisitioning. 
After the examination of the plans, specifications and contracts, interests and names of 
owners, lists of their payments under the contract, and of each ship under construction, 
the Fleet Corporation gave further information to the shipbuilders. This was done on or 
about August 22nd. 1917, as regards all the present claimants, except in the cases of 
claims 12-15 ; in these the information was given after November 15th. 1917. x This 
further information was as follows: 
The ships now under construction at your plant and referred to above, having been 
requisitioned by the duly authorized order of this Corporation and title thereto taken over 
by the United States and an order having been placed with you by due authority to 
complete the construction of said ships with all practicable despatch, you are further 
ordered by the President of the United States, represented by this Corporation, to proceed 
in the work of completion heretofore ordered, in conformity with the requirements of the 
contract, plans, and specifications under which construction proceeded prior to the 
requisition of August 3, 1917, in so far as the said contract describes the ship, the 
materials, machinery, equipment, outfit, workmanship, insurance, classification, and 
survey thereof, including the meeting of the requirements of the said contract, and all 
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tests as to efficiency and capacity of the ship on completion and in so far as the contract 
contains provisions for the benefit and protection of the person with whom the contract 
was made, but not otherwise. All work will proceed under the inspection of such persons 
as have been or may hereafter, from time to time, be designated by this Corporation for 
that purpose. For the work of completion heretofore and herein ordered the Corporation 
will pay to you amount* equal to payments set forth in the contract and not yet paid; 
provided, that on acceptance in writing of this order you agree that on final acceptance of 
the vessel to give a bill of sale to the United States in satisfactory form conveying all 
your rights, title, and interests in the vessel, together with your certificate that the vessel 
is free from liens, claims, or equities, with the exception of those of the owner and then 
only of those set forth in the contract. Compensation to the shipbuilder for expedition and 
for extra work will, when deemed appropriate, be made the subject of a subsequent order. 
This order applies only to vessels actually under construction, and in accepting it the 
Corporation expects you to inform it of the actual stage of construction of each vessel or 
the parts to be assembled therein on the date of requisitioning, August 3, 1917. The 
Corporation reserves the right to decide whether or not a vessel was actually under 
construction on August 3, 1917, on consideration of the ascertained facts. In replying to 
this communication please arrange to specify separately the vessels to which this order 
refers, and refer to the corresponding contract in sufficient terms for identification of it. 
Please furnish a copy of this to (name of Shipbuilder) and ask for an early reply. 
It would be superfluous to mention here that a "bill of sale" in the United States is 
considered as the instrument of transfer of property, and that ships, although considered 
as a species of personal property, are subject also to special rules. A ship does not pass by 
delivery, nor does the possession of it prove the title to it. The next step of the 
Corporation was to give generally the same information to the owners of the shipbuilding 
contracts, and to require information whether a brokerage commission "claimed as part of 
the contract price of vessels" had been "paid or agreed to be paid on account of each 
uncompleted contract for vessels covered by the requisition order of August 3rd, 1917, 
giving the name of the broker and the amount paid or to be paid, and the times when 
payments are due, together with a copy of the brokerage agreement." Such letters were 
written, for instance, with reference to the ships included in claims 1 and 2 on September 
18th, 1917, to the Manitowoc Shipbuilding Co. To the Columbia River Shipbuilding Co., 
Admiral Capps wrote as follows on November 21st, 1917: Re Completion of 
requisitioned hulls. Your letter of October 25, 1917, relative to vessels requisitioned by 
this Corporation and under construction in your yard, has been received. From 
information at hand the above letter is understood to apply to your hulls No. 1 to 10 
inclusive. You will proceed with the completion of these hulls to meet the requirements 
of the contracts in force on August 3, 1917, between you and the Northwest Steel Co. As 
just compensation for and as a reasonable price of such completion the Corporation will 
pay to you a total sum equivalent to the total unpaid amounts on contracts between you 
and the Northwest Steel Company. Payments will be made on receipt of vouchers 
submitted through the district officer to this Corporation on a form to be forwarded to 
you and after certification by the district officer that such payments are due and 
warranted. The above arrangements in this letter in reference to payments are based upon 
the assumption that there are no unpaid brokerage fees. If there are unpaid brokerage fees 
on said contracts, then the total amount of such fees will be deducted from the total 
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unpaid amounts on the said contracts. The district officer will be instructed to continue 
the inspection of work and material to insure that the vessels, when completed, will be 
equal in all respects to what was contemplated by the requirements of the contracts in 
force on August 3, 1917, between you and the Northwest Steel Company, and you will 
provide the district officer and his representatives all facilities necessary for the 
performance of this duty. 
This last letter refers to claim 6, where the delivery of the completed ship was expected 
for December 1st. It is common ground that the shipbuilders complied with these orders 
of the Corporation, repeating generally the words which had been suggested to them by 
the Corporation. The following is an example of one of the shipbuilders' replies: 
Dear Sir. Re requisitioned ships. A copy of a letter dated August 22, 1917. has been 
delivered to us with the request that we reply to the same and give the information therein 
called for, and in compliance to such request we beg to say : In obedience to the order of 
the President of the United States, represented by the United States Shipping Board 
Emergency Fleet Corporation, we will execute and deliver to the United States, or to the 
United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, bills of sale of ships now 
under construction in our yard as they are completed and which were requisitioned on 
August 3, 1917, upon the following conditions : 1. The payments by you of all amounts 
specified in each several contract unpaid by the purchaser, said payments to be made by 
you pursuant to the terms of the contract. 2. The refunding to us of all customs duties 
paid by us upon any equipment going into the construction of hulls 80 and 81. 3. The 
payment to us of all extras and alterations not covered by the contract, ordered by 
authorized representatives. 4. The payment to us of all supplies ordered by authorized 
representatives furnished by this company for the outfitting of such ships. In addition to 
the bill of sale, which is to be in such form as will be satisfactory, we will deliver a 
certificate that the vessel described in such bill of sale is free from liens, claims or 
equities excepting only equities and rights of the purchaser under the contract under 
which such ships were constructed. You are further advised that on August 3, 1917, the 
undersigned was under contract to construct ihe following ships, above 2,500 tons 
deadweight capacity, which are designated by us by hull numbers as follows : Hull Nos. 
80, 81. 82, 83. 86, 87, 88, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94 and 95. You are further advised that we will 
proceed with all practicable dispatch the complete construction of said ships. 
Without entering here into further details, the Tribunal, upon the abundant evidence 
brought by the United States, are of opinion that not only were material, plans, 
specifications and other such physical or intangible property of the claimants taken, but 
also their money, for the United States did not refund their previous payments either to 
the shipbuilders or to the shipowners. The fact that the progress payments were not 
refunded by the United States Emergency Fleet Corporation to the shipbuilders is 
specially strong evidence to show that the contracts with these builders were not 
cancelled by the United States' orders of August, that the property of the owners was not 
considered as destroyed as between the Fleet Corporation and the shipbuilders, and that 
the Fleet Corporation took over the legal rights and duties of the shipowners towards the 
shipbuilders. The necessary consequence is that the Corporation took over the lights and 
duties of the shipbuilders towards the shipowners. It expressly required the shipbuilders 
to give the Corporation a bill of sale which, when delivered to it, would, in the opinion of 
the Tribunal, relieve the shipbuilders from any liability to the previous owners in regard 
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to their "liens, rights and equities" as set forth in their respective contracts. The 
shipbuilders were thus entirely relieved of any obligation to the former owners, for the 
Corporation inserted itself between the builders and the shipowners by an exercise of 
what is called, in the United States Law and Jurisprudence, the power of eminent domain. 
This action can be considered, as far as the private shipbuilders are concerned, as a case 
offeree majeure" or restraint of princes and rulers. In other words, the Corporation seems 
to have intended, in August 1917, to assume towards the Contract-owners the legal 
position of the shipbuilding contractor. The main obligation of such contractors was to 
proceed with the construction, and to deliver the ships to the owners of the contracts. 
Further, the fact that the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation 
kept, and has had the exclusive profit up to the present time of, the progress payments 
made to the shipbuilders by the claimants or their assignors, amounting to almost 21,2 
million dollars, is of especial importance, not only with regard to the material 
consequences of such action, but also in connection with the legal aspect of the whole 
case. It will be seen later on that the Corporation Managers, after having taken control of 
the shipyards, took also the property of the claimants in such a way as to destroy it. But it 
should be stated at once that in connection, with the taking of the claimants' money, the 
Corporation, having first ordered the completion of all the 15 contracts, delayed or even 
cancelled the construction of the hulls for which the New Jersey Shipbuilding Co., had 
contracted. Claims 13, 14 and 15 are based upon contracts which, to quote the United 
States Case, Chart I, "were never completed but were suspended on January 31, 1919,'and 
cancelled on August 23rd. 1919. Before their keels were laid." As the Tribunal is of 
opinion that the good faith of the United States Emergency Fleet Corporation is to be 
presumed, the Corporation must be given the credit of having contemplated delivery of 
the ships to their former owners, and of having written its first letters to the shipbuilders 
and shipowners for the purpose of having the ships built and delivered. The first objects 
of the Corporation were evidently at that time to take control of the shipyards and of the 
contracts in order to expedite the construction of the ships, and to modify the ships, if 
necessary, in order to meet the war requirements. This policy was not subsequently 
carried out by the Fleet Corporation. There were several successive changes in the 
personnel of the leading technical and legal advisers of the Corporation, and among the 
Directors themselves and these changes apparently resulted in a change of policy. The 
Corporation seemed to have forgotten that it had assumed certain contractual obligations, 
and in particular to have ignored the fact that the retention of the money of the claimants 
without restoring the ships was obviously unlawful. Such action was not only contrary to 
international law, but also to the municipal law of the United States. The amounts of the 
progress payments should have been refunded at the time of the requisitioning of the 
ships. There can be no excuse for waiting until 1919 to make an assessment of these 
amounts. The Corporation could not have entertained any doubt after October 6th. 1917, 
that an immediate settlement of the claims was imperative. The Corporation may have 
intended, up to October 6th. 1917, to settle accounts with regard to these claims, namely 
so long as it was expected that the property of the claimants would be restored at the end 
of the war. More especially the Corporation should not have had any doubt with regard to 
claims 13 to 15 as to the legality of its action according to municipal law as well as under 
international law, after it had informed the shipbuilders not to go on with these contracts. 
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The Tribunal is therefore of opinion: 1. That, whatever the intentions may have been, the 
United States took, both in fact and in law, the contracts under which the ships in 
question were being or were to be constructed. 2. That in fact the claimants were fully 
and for ever deprived of their property and that this amounts to a requisitioning by the 
exercise of the power of eminent domain within the meaning of American municipal law. 
III. 
THE DATE ON WHICH CLAIMANTS' PROPERTY WAS EFFECTIVELY 
REQUISITIONED . 
The Parties have disagreed as to The date, the object and the purport of the requisition. 
Norway's contention is that the requisition should not be considered legally effective 
against the several members of the "Christiania Group"— the present fifteen claimants—
until October 6th, 1917, when the negotiations between the special Norwegian Mission 
and the Shipping Board may be said to have been concluded by the formal notification 
from Mr. Hurley, Chairman of the Board, to Dr. Nansen, head of that Mission. Norway 
has contended that the contracts were requisitioned, and that, whatever may have been 
said to the claimants by the Fleet Corporation, the Tribunal has only to consider the real 
facts, in other words what the Fleet Corporation did; and that the action of the 
Corporation amounted to a taking without paying just compensation for the property so 
taken. The contention of the United States is, on the other hand, that the requisition 
became effective against the claimants on August 3rd, 1917, the day of the general order 
issued to the American Shipyards; that the agreement between the Department of State 
and the Norwegian Minister was merely to suspend the requisition of completed vessels, 
but not of vessels under construction and that the requisition of the latter, though 
anticipated, was not yet announced; and that The Emergency Fleet Corporation did not 
requisition contracts, but took only actual physical property, consisting of ships and 
materials for ships, together with commitments for material for ships, and that the 
property which it actually requisitioned is the only thing to be valued. ' As Counsel for 
the Kingdom of Norway laid considerable stress upon the negotiations which took place 
in 1917 between the United States Department of State and the Norwegian Minister at 
Washington, Mr. Bryn, it is necessary to summarise the facts as to these negotiations and 
to examine their influence upon the legal position of the Parties. In February 1917, as 
soon as the bill was introduced in the United States Senate and House of Representatives 
which proposed to prevent foreign owners of vessels "now being constructed or hereafter 
constructed in the United States" from registering their ships under foreign flags 
(proposals which matured on June 15 th in the Emergency Shipping Fund Provision of 
the Urgent Deficiencies Act), the Norwegian Minister called the attention of the 
Secretary of State to the fact that as said bills do not provide for compensation to foreign 
shipowners, the Norwegian citizens for whose account the ships are now building in 
American yards would suffer a tremendous loss, amounting to many millions of dollars, 
if said provisions should be enacted into law. The Attorney for the principal group (so 
called Stray Group) of Norwegian owners of Shipbuilding Contracts, and the United 
States Shipping Board endeavoured to reach a friendly solution of the difficulties raised 
by the Norwegian Government by a voluntary agreement (similar to the agreement 
arrived at between Great Britain and Norway), safeguarding the interests of the United 
States by placing these vessels at the disposal of the government during the war and for a 
reasonable period (six months) afterwards. The negotiations were largely conducted 
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through informal conferences with a special Norwegian Mission, presided over by Dr. 
Fridtjof Nansen. It is proved by the attitude of the United States themselves, that they 
complied with a formal request of Mr. Bryn to the Department of State, dated June 28th, 
1917, to delay temporarily, until the arrival of the Norwegian Mission, "the executing, as 
far as same would involve Norwegian shipping interests, of the authority given to the 
President by the provisions of the Act approved June 15, 1917, which created an 
Emergency Shipping fund." * The United States have contended that by the Executive 
Order of July 11th, 1917, the President of the United States delegated to the United States 
Shipping Board the authority to requisition constructed vessels, and to the United States 
Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation the power vested in him of requisitioning 
"vessels in process of construction." On 23rd July, 1917, the Shipping Board passed a 
resolution to requisition "title to and possession of all launched merchant vessels where 
construction is completed, and which construction was commenced in American yards 
under contracts which would lead to foreign documentation", on giving twenty-four 
hours' notice to the diplomatic representatives of the countries of which the foreign 
owners were citizens. On July 24th Mr. F. L. Polk, Acting Secretary of State, notified the 
Norwegian Minister of this resolution. As Dr. Nansen's Norwegian Mission had not yet 
arrived, it was agreed between them that the Norwegian "new buildings" should not be 
requisitioned until the Norwegian Special Mission had arrived, and had had an 
opportunity of taking the matter up with the American Government. The Norwegian 
Minister guaranteed that no vessel built in American yards for Norwegian account would 
be transferred to the Norwegian flag after noon on July 25th. Mr. Polk informed the 
Shipping Board of this arrangement, and the Board, on July 25th, resolved: "that nothing 
be done in connection with the requisitioning of Norwegian ships." 3 Mr. Bryn gave 
instructions accordingly to the Norwegian consuls in the United States, referring to the 
Shipping Board's resolution that "all completed ships were to be requisitioned", and these 
instructions were carried out. Only one new steamer, the "Dicto", was authorized by the 
United States to clear, and for this ship the Norwegian certificate of nationality had been 
issued by the Norwegian consul at San Francisco on the morning of July 25th. 
On August 3rd, 1917, Mr. Hurley, the Chairman of the United States Shipping Board, 
informed President Wilson that "after consultation with Admiral Capps, and with his 
approval", the Board decided that the Emergency Fleet Corporation should proceed at 
once to commandeer all ships of suitable tonnage now being constructed in American 
shipyards, so that their completion may be expedited, and their disposition determined in 
the manner best adapted to the present needs of the nation. We deem it of the highest 
importance that this action be taken without delay. The question as to what disposition 
shall be made of the requisitioned ships can be determined later, after consultation with 
the Governments for whom, or for whose citizens a part of the ships are being built. The 
general requisition order was issued on the'same day, or on 4th August, by letter and 
telegram, to all the shipbuilders concerned with the claimants (except New Jersey 
Shipbuilding Company). The order to practically all of the American Shipbuilders was 
worded as follows: By virtue of an Act approved June 15th, 1917, and authority 
delegated to the Emergency Fleet Corporation by Executive Order of July 11th, 1917, all 
power driven cargo-carrying and passenger vessels above 2,500 tons, deadweight 
capacity, under construction in your yards, and materials, machinery, equipment and 
outfit thereto pertaining, are hereby requisitioned by the United States and will be 
 84 
completed with all practicable despatch. Letter follows. ' One of the purposes of this 
statutory order is clear: the construction must be completed as rapidly as possible. 
Whether the requisition was for title or for use, and what would be the compensation etc.. 
was not disclosed, and the requisition letter was equally reticent, containing only a 
promise "that the compensation to be paid will be determined hereafter, and will include 
ships, material and contracts requisilioned." The Tribunal is of opinion that the Shipping 
Board and the Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation were bona fide if they 
considered the order to American shipbuilders was consistent with an "agreement for the 
maintenance of the status quo on both sides". It is reasonable to infer that they had not 
rejected at that time the Norwegian suggestion of a voluntary agreement and that they did 
not deem it necessary to pay immediately the just compensation, nor to make even an 
inventory of the things taken. Their attitude may be explained by a belief on their part 
that future accounts would be settled by voluntary agreement. It appears from the minutes 
of October 4th, 1917, that at that date the Members of the United States Shipping Board, 
held strongly divergent views with regard to the requisitioning of foreign vessels. While 
the majority proposed "that the Board conform its action with reference to foreign 
tonnage to the action already taken by the Board with reference to the British and French 
ships", Vice-Chairman Stevens presented the following resolution: that vessels building 
for Norwegian account, commandeered by the Emergency Fleet Corporation, be 
transferred to American Corporations to be formed by their owners, on condition that 
they voluntarily charter the vessels to the Board, bare boat or time charter, at Board's 
option, for the period of the war and six months thereafter, at the general requisition rate 
established by the Board, and reimburse the Corporation for all expenditure incurred in 
the completion of the vessels. 
The motion not being seconded, the Vice-Chairman moved "that the question is of such 
international importance that it be referred to the President." This motion also not being 
seconded, the Chairman of the Shipping Board, after having stated to the Board that the 
decision arrived at was to "retain the title to the tonnage for the present", wrote to Dr. 
Fridtjof Nansen, at Washington, D. C, on October 6th, 1917, as follows: 
After careful inquiry into the present and prospective war needs of the United States and 
of the Allies, . . . the Board has concluded that it is its duty to retain for urgent military 
purposes, all vessels building in this country for foreign account, title to which was 
commandeered by the United States on August 3rd. The decision includes necessarily the 
vessels building for Norwegian account. ... I need not add that it is our intention to 
compensate the owners of commandeered vessels, be they American, Allied or Neutral, 
to the full measure required by the generous principles of American Public Law. 
After stating that, while this decision of the Board covered the case of one of the 
Norwegian ships commandeered, the "Wilhelm Jebsen". and that the Board approved a 
friendly settlement with regard to the "Jeannette Skinner", Mr. Hurley added: 
I greatly regret the delay that has unavoidably attended the decision of this matter, and 
feel certain that you will appreciate that it was due solely to our keen desire to consider 
fully and weigh conscientiously the arguments which the representative of the Norwegian 
shipowners and of your mission have placed before us. 
The correspondence between Dr. Nansen and Mr. Hurley continued in December, Dr. 
Nansen on behalf of Norway claiming on December 8th that these vessels "are being 
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temporarily requisitioned by the American Government", while Mr. Hurley closed the 
correspondence on December 21st, 1917, by a letter stating that: 
Mr. Munson has referred to me your letter to him, dated December 8, regarding insurance 
on vessels building in American yards for Norwegian account and commandeered by the 
Government of the United States. I also have your letter of December 18 on the same 
subject. Since these vessels have been completely and permanently taken over by the 
United States, it does not seem to me that the former Norwegian owners need be at all 
concerned over the question of insurance. The responsibility for loss or injury to the 
vessels is entirely in the Government of the United States, since the United States now 
hold title to the vessels. The former Norwegian owners have, under our Constitution and 
under the statutes governing the matter, a claim against the United States for just 
compensation, which claim I hope may be satisfactorily adjusted at an early date. 
It cannot be denied, therefore, that the United States did claim in October 1917, to be the 
holders of the tide to the Norwegian property, and that they expressly refused every 
interference from the claimants. It is not necessary to examine here whether the holding 
of the title was valid. It is sufficient to state that the United States, in fact, did take and 
hold the title, the property of the claimants; that they had the "de facto" possession, 
enjoyment and use, and that they acted as owners of the claimants' property after the 
formal taking, as notified by the Shipping Board to Dr. Nansen. After a most careful 
examination of the evidence produced on both sides, the Tribunal has come to the 
conclusion that: 1st. The Requisition became effective in August 1917, as regards the 
American shipbuilders ; 2nd. But the requisition of the whole property of the claimants 
became effective only on and after October 1917. The date of October 6, 1917, may be 
admitted for all claimants. The general requisition order of August 3rd, 1917, as well as 
the previous Statutes and Presidential Orders, certainly had legal importance, as they 
gave power to the executive officers to prohibit the export of materials, the transfer of 
ships to foreign flags, etc. But the requisition order did not say, for instance, that all the 
property of the foreign shipowners should be taken, not even that it should be taken for 
title or forever. It was construed as leaving it to the competent officers' discretion whether 
some of the ships under construction should be requisitioned or not. In fact, till October 
1917, there was, in some cases, considerable doubt as to the ultimate decision, and some 
orders of requisition were not given until the end of November 1917. As long as the Fleet 
Corporation was not following "due process of law", nor offering the "just compensation" 
provided for by American law for the property taken, it can be doubted whether the 
requisition was "effective", and the Tribunal, by admitting the date of October 6, 1917, as 
the date of requisition, has made ample provision for the special difficulties and the 
emergency invoked by the United States. Another fact must be taken into consideration, 
not only with regard to the duration of the effective requisition, but also to the liability of 
the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation. Without examining here 
whether the Corporation could have kept the use and efficient control of the claimants' 
ships, but not their title, during the war, the Tribunal records that its attention was 
specially drawn to the fact that as early as February 1919, the Emergency Fleet 
Corporation was giving back to their former owners some of the ships which had been 
needed during the war. but for which there was no further use. After the Armistice was 
signed, in November 1918, and before the signature of the Treaty of Peace with 
Germany, there were no hostilities between the United States and any other nation. 
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Counsel for the United States has conceded that the bulk of the American Army was 
demobilised in the spring of 1919 and, while the United States were still "technically at 
war", the reasons stated by the Shipping Board in support of its attitude had undoubtedly 
ceased to exist. The Tribunal is of opinion that, whatever may be said in favour of the 
taking for title of the claimants' property during the war, there was no sufficient reason 
for keeping these ships after the signature of the Versailles Treaty in June 1919. The 
reasons which have been given afford no legal interest which this International Tribunal 
could recognize as being superior to the rights of private foreign citizens in their own 
property. 
IV. 
THE LAW GOVERNING THE ARBITRATION.  
[…] 
V. 
THE AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION. 
It is common ground between the Parties that just compensation, as it is understood in the 
United States, should be liberally awarded, and that it should be based upon the net value 
of the property taken. It has been somewhat difficult to fix the real market value of some 
of these shipbuilding contracts. The value must be assessed ex œquo et bono. The Parties 
have obviously acted in a way which would not have been usual or even possible under 
ordinary circumstances, when peaceful shipping and shipbuilding were entirely free, and 
not hampered in their customary activities by the intervention of enemy or friendly 
Governments. The growing scarcity of ships in 1917, the risks and difficulties due to 
submarine warfare and to the extension of the field of hostilities, contributed to make 
speculative shipbuilding transactions possible and even unavoidable. Belligerents and 
neutrals alike were fearful for their existence. The hardships of neutrality were felt so 
deeply by the United States themselves that they declared war on Germany ELS the only 
means of defence against its "repeated acts of War against the Government and the 
people of the United States of America". All neutral Nations needed ships for their food, 
materials and other commodities. Some governments took measures to protect 
themselves against speculation in ships and other property; they imposed standard prices 
and requisitioned ships for use during the war, etc. As a rule, abnormal circumstances, 
speculative prices, etc., cannot form, the legal basis of compensation in condemnation 
awards. While fair compensation cannot be artificially increased by such methods as 
were adopted by one of those interested in the case and which have been brought to the 
notice of this Tribunal, it would be equally unjust to attach much weight to artificial 
reduction of hire, chartering or purchase price of ships, as fixed under compulsion, 
requisition or othpr e-nvf rnmental action during the war. 
For the reasons already stated in Chapter IV, the Tribunal is not bound by section 3477 of 
the Revised Statutes of the United States, 1878 (quoted in U.S. Case Appendix page 51); 
nor by section 24 of the Judicial Code of the United States 1911 ; nor by section 4 of the 
Naval Emergency Fund Act of 4th March, 1917 ; nor by any other municipal law, in so 
far as these provisions restricted the right of the claimants to receive immediate and full 
compensation, with interest from the day on which the compensation should have been 
fully paid ex aquo et bono. Just compensation should have been paid to the Claimants or 
arranged with them on the basis of the net value of the property taken: 1. On the 6th 
October, 1917, for use, during the war (whenever such use was possible without 
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destroying the property, according to the contract, state of completion of ship, etc.), and 
2. At the latest on the 1st July 1919, as damages for the unlawful retaining of the title and 
use of the ships after all emergency ceased; or On the 6th October, 1917, as full 
compensation for the destruction of the Norwegian property. Liberal compensation 
should be allowed in each case, inasmuch as the United States "recognizes its liability to 
make just compensation for the value of the property taken on August 3rd, 1917".1 The 
amounts offered as compensation by the United States are shown in the table set out at 
the commencement of this award. After careful comparative examination of the results of 
the two systems above described, the Tribunal is of opinion that the compensation 
hereinafter awarded is the fair market value of the claimants' property. In assessing the 
net amount of compensation, the Tribunal has taken into consideration in each case all 
the circumstances pertaining to the net value of the property requisitioned or taken by the 
United States and especially the following: the date of each contract or sub-contract 
between shipbuilder and shipowner; the technical characteristics and qualities of each 
contract (type and dead weight tonnage of the ship; its speed, etc. ; the reputation, 
experience, technical and financial situation of the shipyard); the legal value of the 
contract, namely the liens, rights and interests in each original contract, etc. ; the original 
contract (or sub-contract) price; the progress (and brokerage) payments made by each of 
the parties on the original contract price; the date of delivery promised in the contract ; 
the date of delivery which was expected at or about the date of the general requisition 
order and about the date of the effective requisition of each contract as far as these can be 
ascertained; the various elements pertaining to the value and degree of completion of the 
tangible objects of completion as: for instance, the percentage of materials ordered, and 
the percentage of materials on hand ; the date at which the keel was laid, before or after 
the general requisition; and the date when the ship was launched; the contracts, 
settlements, etc. made by the United States and by Norwegian or other shipowners, or by 
third parties, whether governments or private persons, whether with shipowners or 
shipbuilders, for the construction or purchase or hire of ships ; the statistics, reports and 
opinions of experts produced by the Parties ; the Award of the United States Claims 
Committee on the present claims ; the reports of the Ocean Advisory Committee on just 
compensation for certain American ships lost in the service of the government; etc. On 
the other hand the Tribunal has taken into consideration all the facts, which are 
exclusively or principally due to the United States' action (whether before or after the 
requisition of the shipyards and the effective requisition of the claimants' property), and 
which therefore may be considered as res inter alios acta, or as being without or of 
negligible influence upon the net value of property lost by the claimants. 
VI. 
INTEREST ON SUMS AWARDED. 
The Tribunal is competent to allow interest as part of the compensation ex aquo et bono, 
if the circumstances are considered to justify it. So far as interest after the date of this 
award is concerned, the Parties decided in the Agreement of 30th June, 1921, that "any 
amount granted by the award rendered shall bear interest at the rate of six per centum per 
annum from the date of the rendition of the decision until the date of payment". As this is 
a case of expropriation, the Tribunal is of opinion that interest should be paid. The Parties 
have cited before the Tribunal the work of Nichols on "The Law of Eminent Domain" 
(Albany, N.Y., 1917), in which is expressed the following opinion: 
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"The theory of the law is that, when land is taken by eminent domain, or when it is 
injured in such a way as to create a constitutional right to damages, payment for the land 
thus affected should be co-incident with the taking or injury, and, if for any reason 
payment is postponed, the right to interest from the time that payment ought to have 
been, until it is actually made, follows as a matter of strict constitutional right. . . . When 
the owner is not paid the compensation until after the taking or injury is complete. ... it is 
well settled that he is entitled to interest, or at least to its equivalent in the form of 
damages for the detention of his money." (S. 216.) 
Similar opinions are expressed in section 742 of Lewis' "A Treatise on the Law of 
Eminent Domain" (Chicago 1909), which book was also cited before the Tribunal. In 
coming to the conclusion that interest should be awarded, the Tribunal has taken into 
consideration the facts that the United States have had the use and profits of the 
claimants' property since the requisition of five years ago, and especially that the sums 
awarded as compensation to the claimants by the American Requisition Claim 
Committee have not been paid; finally that the United States have had the benefit of the 
progress payments made by Norwegians with reference to these ships. The Tribunal is of 
opinion that the claimants are entitled to special compensation in respect of interest and 
that some of the claimants are, in view of the circumstances of their cases, entitled to 
higher rates of interest than others. The claimants have asked for compound interest witli 
half-yearly adjustments, but compound interest has not been granted in previous 
arbitration cases, and the Tribunal is of opinion that the claimants have not advanced 
sufficient reasons why an award of compound interest, in this case, should be made. In 
view of all these circumstances, therefore, the Tribunal is of opinion that it is just to allow 
a lump sum to each claimant in respect of interest for a period of five years from 6th 
October, 1917. Such lump sums have been included in the total amounts of compensation 
awarded in respect of each claim. As the Tribunal is of the opinion that full compensation 
should have been paid, including loss of progress payments, etc., at the latest on the day 
of the effective taking, and as the Tribunal has assessed the net value of the property and 
has decided to award damages as on that date, interest should, contrary to the claim of 
Norway, not run before that date as previous interest is included in the estimate of the net 
value. 
VII. 
THE CLAIM OF PAGE BROTHERS. 
[…] 
VIII. 
FOR THESE REASONS THE TRIBUNAL OF ARBITRATION DECIDES AND 
AWARDS THAT: 
I. The United States of America shall pay to the Kingdom of Norway the following sums: 
In claim No. 1 by the Skibsaktieselskapet "Manitowoc" the sum of $845,000 In claim No. 
2 by the Skibsaktieselskapet "Manitowoc" the sum of 845,000 In claim No. 3 by the 
Dampskibsaktieselskapet" Baltimore" the sum of. 1,625,000 In claim No. 4 by the 
Dampskibsaktieselskapet "Vard II" the sum of 2,065,000 Out of this amount of 
$2,065,000 the United States are entitled to retain a sum of $22,800 in order that this sum 
be paid to Page Brothers; In claim No. 5 by the Aktieselskapet SOrlandske Lloyd the sum 
of $2,045,000 In claim No. 6 by the Dampskibsaktieselskapet Ostlandet the sum of. 
2,890,000 In claim No. 7 by Jacob Prebensen jun. the sum of 160,000 
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In claim No. 8 by the Dampskibsaktieselskapet "Tromp" the sum of. $160,000 In claim 
No. 9 by the Aktieselskapet "Maritim" the sum of 175,000 In claim No. 10 by the 
Aktieselskapet "Haug" the sum'of.... 175,000 In claim No. 11 by the Aktieselskapet 
"Mercator" the sum of 190,000 In claim No. 12 by the Aktieselskapet Sôrlandske Lloyd 
the sum of 205,000 InclaimNo. 13 by H. Kjerschow the sum of 205,000 In claim No. 14 
by Harry Borthen the sum of 205,000 InclaimNo. 15 by E. & N. Evensen the sum of. 
205,000 II. The claim made by the United States of America on behalf of Page Brothers 
is disallowed as against the Kingdom of Norway, but a sum of $22,800 may be retained 
by the United States as stated under claim No. 4 above. Done at The Hague, in the 
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